Abstract

Recent scholarship is nearly unanimous in attributing some form of egoism to Leibniz’s moral philosophy. In this paper, I argue that there are substantive reasons to reject this status quo. First, I argue that any non-trivial form of egoism must take all of an agent’s ends to be self-directed, and that this is incompatible with Leibniz’s theory of justice. Second, I argue that a rational psychology is non-trivially hedonist only if it understands pleasure as a separately identifiable aim of all actions, and that this is incompatible with Leibniz account of pleasure.

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Additional Information

ISSN
1538-4586
Print ISSN
0022-5053
Pages
pp. 601-624
Launched on MUSE
2016-11-03
Open Access
No
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