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Reviewed by:
  • Scientists at War: The Ethics of Cold War Weapons Research by Sarah Bridger
  • Rebecca Slayton (bio)
Scientists at War: The Ethics of Cold War Weapons Research. By Sarah Bridger. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015. Pp. 368. $45.

The relationship between scientists and war raises numerous complex questions. Does military research represent a diversion from “pure” science, or is science intrinsically political? What responsibilities do scientists have for the uses of their research? How should scientists be involved in shaping policies that affect international security? Are they more effective as government insiders or outsiders? Should they deliver purely technical advice, or do ethics and politics inevitably shape their recommendations?

These are among the many questions raised in Sarah Bridger’s Scientists at War, an epic account of scientists’ involvement in cold war research, development, and policy.

The book focuses on the United States, and is organized around several key episodes: the negotiation of the limited nuclear test ban; the research, development, and use of defoliants in the Vietnam War; the role of physicists, particularly the top-secret JASON group, in advising the U.S. government about the Vietnam War; protests and controversies about the role of universities and professional organizations in military research during the late 1960s and the 1970s; and the Star Wars debate of the 1980s. Most [End Page 696] of these events have been well-discussed by other historians. The strength of Scientists at War lies in drawing a narrative thread among these episodes so as to shed new light on how each new development built on previous experience. The story that emerges is one of scientists reaching their peak influence during negotiations on the nuclear test ban in the 1950s and early 1960s, followed by a slow realization of their limitations as they unsuccessfully sought to end, or at least reduce the violence of, the Vietnam War.

The book pivots on the controversies and changes that accompanied scientists’ involvement in the Vietnam War. In the mid-1960s, Jack Ruina, a professor of electrical engineering at MIT, was among the government advisors who considered whether they should “explore the possibility that a ‘Manhattan District’ effort could not in fact produce an effective system in time to stop this war in Vietnam” (p. 121). These words suggest an optimism that sprang from previous successes, both in developing weapons and encouraging arms control. But ultimately, scientists failed to end or even curb the war through technological interventions. Physical chemist George Kistiakowsky, who played a central role in the nuclear test ban debate, was among the scientists who ultimately resigned from Defense Department advising, disillusioned about his ability to effect positive change.

The Vietnam War also revealed a generational split, as universities across the United States erupted in protest against involvement in the war, and younger scientists criticized their elders for their apparent complicity with the military. Activists pressed professional associations and universities to acknowledge the intrinsic politics of science and technology. While professional scientific associations largely avoided explicit political statements, they institutionalized new modes of political engagement, such as the American Physical Society’s Forum on Physics & Society. This increased willingness to tackle issues at the intersection of science and policy came to fruition during the Star Wars debate in the mid-1980s, as the American Physical Society organized a study on the technical feasibility of lasers and other directed energy weapons to fulfill President Ronald Reagan’s dream of rendering nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete. The Star Wars debate helped to reunite younger and older scientists, though significant divisions in the scientific community remained.

Despite the book’s ostensible focus on science, much of it concerns technology. For example, Bridger cites a 1967 pamphlet indicting MIT for complicity in the Vietnam War: “The man who designs the gun is just as guilty as the man who pulls the trigger, for without him there would be no gun. … Scientists are not instruments of society, they are MEN with a conscience. Technology is not neutral, it is directed” (p. 163). However, Bridger does not discuss technology as something distinct from science. Nor does Scientists at War delve deeply into questions about the relationships between and among science, technology...

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