A Global People’s Liberation Army: Possibilities, Challenges, and Opportunities

note The authors’ names appear in alphabetical order. Sections of this article were presented as testimony to the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. See Oriana Skylar Mastro, “Developments in China’s Military Force Projection and Expeditionary Capabilities,” testimony prepared for the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Washington, D.C., January 21, 2016; and Kristen Gunness, “PLA Expeditionary Capabilities and Implications for United States Asia Policy,” testimony prepared for the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Washington, D.C., January 21, 2016. Dr. Mastro would like to thank John Chen and Yilin Sun for their excellent research assistance.

Executive summary

This article assesses the factors shaping whether China will develop significant military expeditionary capabilities, the conditions under which Chinese leaders may decide to use the military outside East Asia, and implications for the U.S.

Main argument

Developing expeditionary capabilities for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is a priority for Chinese leaders, and the Chinese public’s expectation for protection while abroad further motivates such plans. Moreover, Chinese strategic thinking about the nature of such a capability suggests that the doctrinal development to support an expeditionary force is already underway. But even if China develops this capability, Beijing may not always choose to use it. The conditions under which China may employ its expeditionary capabilities can be expected to generate four types of behavior depending on the degree to which China is directly targeted and the receptivity of the international community to a larger Chinese role: activism, team play, vigilantism, and free riding. Based on this analysis, the U.S. should be open to a greater role for the PLA under most conditions.

Policy implications

• • The best outcome for the U.S. is one in which China is a team player and contributes to multilateral operations even when its own interests are only peripherally threatened. Discussion among U.S. allies and partners can help mitigate operational risks.

• • When Chinese interests abroad are targeted and the U.S. does not have interests at stake, Washington should try to shape China’s actions to minimize unintended consequences. Depending on the situation, international pressure may be sufficient to prevent vigilantism.

• • Given the PLA’s expanding role, the U.S. should work to broaden military exchanges with China to include all U.S. combatant commands, connect defense and diplomatic attachés around the world, and complement global policy objectives.

• • China’s expeditionary capabilities create opportunities for the U.S. to develop closer military relationships in Asia—for example, by helping India patrol the Indian Ocean should Chinese naval presence there become routine.

For more than a decade, China has been developing the necessary expeditionary military capabilities to protect its interests beyond the East Asia region.¹ As China assumes a larger role in world affairs, these interests have expanded substantially and increasingly require the capacity to secure investments and business ventures around the globe, including the millions of People’s Republic of China (PRC) citizens living abroad, access to energy and other natural resources, and continued access to critical shipping lanes. To this end, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has begun to engage in missions far beyond its borders, including humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR), noncombatant evacuation operations, counterpiracy operations, and the protection of sea lines of communication (SLOC).

While hardly surprising given China’s global interests, the development of military expeditionary capabilities has raised concerns both in the United States and abroad about what role the PLA will play in global affairs and how that role may affect or constrain other countries. Examples include wariness about China’s intentions following the announcement of a PLA logistics base in Djibouti, anxiety in New Delhi after PLA Navy (PLAN) submarines unexpectedly surfaced in the Indian Ocean, and challenges from the United States and others to Chinese naval patrols, conducted with some of the PLAN’s most advanced combatants and submarines, in the farthest reaches of the South China Sea and associated disputed waters...