Abstract

The United States’ war in Afghanistan has pursued the same policy goal for the last decade and a half: eliminating a terrorist safe haven and preventing its reemergence. Policymakers have understood terrorist safe havens to be “ungoverned spaces,” a term that carries a strong presumption against non-state sources of governance. Operating within this conceptual framework, two presidential administrations have proved unable to change the realities of governance in Afghanistan decisively in the United States’ favor. Flawed assumptions about “ungoverned” spaces have played an important role in America’s failure to conclude the war successfully.

pdf

Additional Information

ISSN
1945-4724
Print ISSN
1945-4716
Pages
pp. 97-107
Launched on MUSE
2016-07-12
Open Access
No
Back To Top

This website uses cookies to ensure you get the best experience on our website. Without cookies your experience may not be seamless.