Abstract

Facing a devastating security crisis, Colombian president Alvaro Uribe (2002–10) concentrated power into the executive branch and moved the country toward delegative democracy. While history shows that delegative democracy produces a cycle of institutional weakening that is difficult to break, this trend reversed course under Uribe’s successor, Juan Manuel Santos. This essay argues that in delegative democracies with origins in security crises, strong judiciaries can impose limits on efforts to concentrate power. Even if judiciaries fail to stop initial moves towards delegative democracy, they can ensure that liberal-democratic institutions survive for the next round of politics.

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Additional Information

ISSN
1086-3214
Print ISSN
1045-5736
Pages
pp. 139-147
Launched on MUSE
2016-07-06
Open Access
No
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