America’s Siberian Expedition, 1918–1920: A Study of National Policy by Betty Miller Unterberger (review)

160 THE CANADIAN HISTORICAL REVIEW All these Americans dida greatdisservice totheircountry andtothefree world,yet Mr. Kennan seems to sympathize withthemwhenhe attributes tothem"themost selfless of convictions" (p. 410).At times a knave ispreferable to a fool.With all thisit is an important, well documented, and extremely well written study from thepen of, a diplomat turned historian. Whilstthisreviewer disagrees with the author s thesis andtreatment of his subiect, he cannot fail to recognize itshistorical value. Lr. oNm I. STR•a•OVSK¾ TheUniversity ofToronto America's Siberian Expedition, 1918-I920: A Study of National Policy. By Br.T•YMmLr. R UNTr. ra•r.•Gr.•. Durham,N.C.: Duke University Press [Toronto: Burns & MacEachern]. 1956.Pp.vi, 271. $7.50. Tothealready fairlyextensive literature ontheparticipation oftheUnited States in theAlliedintervention in Siberia Mrs.Unterberger, Director of Adult Education inWhittier, California, has added this study withanemphasis onthediplomacy andtheformulation ofpolicies ofPresident Wilson's administration . In twelve compact, welldocumented chapters anda conclusion, using a largeamount of official andprivate manuscript sources, Mrs.Unterberger relates thesadstory ofindecision, frustration, compromise, andhalf-measures whichcharacterized thisperiod of UnitedStates history in relation to the Russian problem.President Wilsonandhisadvisers wantedto eat their cake andhaveit: theywantedBolshevik Russia to continue the war against Germany, but theydid notwantto dealwith the Bolsheviks. WhenFrance onFebruary 19,1918,offered to giveassistance to theBolsheviks provided thelatter would fightGermany, William Phillips, Assistant Secretary of State, noted: "It isoutof thequestion. Submitted to president whosays thesame thing"(p. 41n.). WhenlaterGreatBritainandFrance proposed military intervention to rallypro-Allied elements in Russia andto combat Bolshevism, the UnitedStates "proposed to sendto Siberiaa commission of merchants, agricultural experts, labour advisers, RedCross representatives andagents of theYoung Men's Christian Association" (p. 78). Whenfinally American troops were sent to Siberia, their commander,General Graves,who "felt he had moretofearfromtheCossacks thanfromtheBolsheviks" (p. 122), wasgiven strictorders to keepneutral in theragingCivfiWar. WhenAmerican Consul General Harris,a veteranof service in Russia, whoregarded Bolshevism asa "realworlddanger," recommended that the Alliesdealwith Bolshevism "not asa Russian problem, butasa worldproblem" (p. 149), hisrecommendation fell on deafears.And whenAmerican troopswere finallyevacuated from Siberia, the LiteraryDigestremarked that "some mighthavelikedusmore if we hadintervened less,that somemighthavedisliked uslessif we had intervened more,but that,havingconcluded that we intended to intervene nomore nornoless thanweactually did,nobody hadanyuseforusat all" (p. 183).Afterthis,onemayquestion Mrs.Unterberger's conclusion that"the positive results of intervention wereduelargely to American participation" (p. 234), unless by "positive results" shemeans thesaving of theBolshevik government atthetimewhen it could have been destroyed. LEONm I. STRAK/IOVSK¾ TheUniversity ofToronto ...