Islamic Political Identity in Turkey by M. Hakan Yavuz, and: Questioning Secularism: Islam, Sovereignty, and the Rule of Law in Modern Egypt by Hussein Ali Agrama, and: Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity by Talal Asad, and: Is Critique Secular?: Blasphemy, Injury, and Free Speech by Talal Asad et al. (review)

How relevant is secularism for the modern Middle East? The problem is that many studies take it for granted that secularism, simply defined as the separation of religion from state and politics, is a key component for the success and well-being of the modern nation-state. It is as if without the state openly declaring itself secular, as the Turkish Republic did in its formative period in 1923–1927, the nation and its institutions would be faced with relentless religious struggles. Education, law, and even the economy would share the burden of a society with core religious values, with the state itself being enmeshed in the struggle. For other scholars, the borderline between the religious and the secular is fairly flexible, lacking the clear distinctions that the secularists would like us to believe exist. And for yet other scholars, religion cannot be contained through an open declaration of the secular nature of the state: Even Turkey, which for over a decade has been under the guidance of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), is “going back” to its Islamic roots. In sum, the importance of religion cannot be denied.

Notwithstanding such diversity of opinions, studies on religion and secularism share common shortcomings—namely, that secularism tends to be isolated on its own as either a sign of modernity and progress or a lack thereof. When we think, for example, of Turkey as the prime example of state secularism being constitutionally adopted, the conditions that made such declaration possible tend to be overlooked—most especially the fact that there was in the 1920s and later a class configuration that was “hegemonic” in its structure. That is, within the heterogeneous class structure, that of landowners, industrialists, politicians, and army and civilian officers, a certain configuration predominates all others by ascertaining a political mission to the newly formed “nation.” Most countries in the Middle East, beginning with influential players like Iran and Egypt, came to modernity with a large class of big landowners, which was immensely influential in politics and the economy. By contrast Turkey’s élite class structure was polyvalent, composed in large part of military and civilian officers that had to be repatriated “home” from the Arab provinces and elsewhere when the Ottoman Empire was in full decline. Consequently, in the top echelons of society, Turkey had an intelligentsia, led by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (who would become Turkey’s first president and founding figure), with enough expertise to develop solutions to the formation of the new republic. The heterogeneous nature of these groups pushed for the creation of a political space that was portrayed as “secular,” in the precise sense that state and politics should be set free from religious discourse. In practice, however, secularism was no more than a secularization of Sunni Islam, whereby minorities were brutally marginalized in a process that began with the Armenian genocide of 1915–1916 and the relentless bloody attempts to integrate Kurdish nationalism within the framework of Turkish nationalism.

According to M. Hakan Yavuz, a key factor in the “return” of political Islam is the solidification of class structure around the bourgeoisie. Initially, the predominantly one-party system of the 1930s and 1940s fostered the creation of an entrepreneurial bourgeois class that was acting...