Abstract

Is aesthetic deference ever rational? In this paper I argue that it can be. I defend aesthetic deference by means of a distinction between two kinds of aesthetic knowledge, predicative aesthetic knowledge and appreciative aesthetic knowledge. Whereas predicative aesthetic knowledge can be transmitted through deferential belief-formation, it is widely believed that appreciative aesthetic knowledge cannot. Building on this distinction and focusing on the relations between these two kinds of aesthetic knowledge I propose conditions under which aesthetic deference can be rational. Nonetheless, I suggest that there may be non-epistemic norms that undermine deferential aesthetic belief formation. In outlining the grounds for rational aesthetic deference, deference to aesthetic experts or educators becomes a possibility.

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Additional Information

ISSN
1543-7809
Print ISSN
0021-8510
Pages
pp. 34-45
Launched on MUSE
2016-04-23
Open Access
No
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