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  • Corps Commanders in Blue: Union Major Generals in the Civil War ed. by Ethan S. Rafuse
  • John Patrick Riley
Corps Commanders in Blue: Union Major Generals in the Civil War. Ed. Ethan S. Rafuse. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2014. ISBN 978-0-8071-5702-2, 320 pp., cloth, $45.00.

Ethan Rafuse has compiled eight case studies of Union corps commanders that highlight the pivotal yet demanding role these men played in shaping the course of the Civil War. The corps system was an innovation imported from European armies and was untried in the American military prior to 1862. The command of these essentially “mini-armies” proved a unique challenge (6). As the direct subordinates of the commanding general, these officers were often the heirs apparent for overall army command and as such brought with them national attention and scrutiny. This edited volume is dedicated to Herman Hattaway and was designed to emulate his General Stephen D. Lee (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 1976).

The contributors do not challenge existing historiography of the Union army or the war in general. They do, however, shine fresh light on the otherwise understudied aspect of field command at the corps level. Arguably the strongest contribution is Brooks Simpson’s chapter on Winfield Scott Hancock. Remembered for his actions at Gettysburg, “Hancock the Superb” is one of the more recognizable and celebrated names in Civil War military history. Simpson argues convincingly, however, that when viewed in the context of a corps commander, Hancock fared quite poorly. At Gettysburg, Hancock was de facto army commander for much of the three-day battle, operating in a defensive role that kept the Union army fighting and concentrated (263). Once he returned to corps command for Grant’s Overland campaign in 1864, Hancock was repeatedly relied upon to execute difficult maneuvers and risky offensive operations, none of which was particularly successful or noteworthy.

John J. Hennessy demonstrates the power politics played in the shaping of military strategy with his chapter on Fitz John Porter, who lost his command due to poor judgement and a habit of publically disparaging his civilian superiors in the Lincoln administration. Kenneth Noe’s excellent chapter on Charles Gilbert shows in no uncertain terms how not to command a corps. Overly harsh and used to strict military discipline, Gilbert utterly failed to make the transition to commanding volunteers and as such was reviled by his own men. Conversely, Christopher Stowe presents George Gordon Meade as a model of efficient, effective generalship at the corps level. Although he spent the second half of the war in Grant’s considerable shadow, Meade’s professionalism and dedication earned him [End Page 231] a respectable reputation. Steven Woodworth depicts James B. McPherson as an officer equal to the task, partly due to the supportive command structure fostered by General Grant. William Franklin, in contrast, was a generally competent officer whose accomplishments were overshadowed by the failures of the commanders under whom he served, notably Burnside and Banks. Rafuse reveals the checkered legacy of “Fighting Joe” Hooker post-Chancellorsville. Sent out west to once again command a corps, Hooker fought with distinction at Chattanooga and served well during the Atlanta campaign, but his contentious personality and insubordination alienated him from Generals Sherman and Grant (221–22).

Thomas Clemens’s chapter on Joseph K. F. Mansfield, a relatively unknown figure to all but the most devoted Antietam buffs, is perhaps the weakest addition. Clemens seems determined to rescue Mansfield from the obscurity of history, since Mansfield is often relegated to the footnotes of the Antietam Campaign (61–62). Mansfield was assigned to command the Twelfth Corps, a posting he held for only two days before falling mortally wounded at Antietam. As such, Mansfield’s potential as a corps commander is forever unknown (88). Because the chapter is heavy on speculation and light on sources and citations, it is not evident to the reader why Mansfield was repeatedly passed over for field duty, nor does his eventual elevation reveal insights about the political landscape of Washington and the armies, which is the single greatest strength of this volume as a whole. While itself a satisfactory biography of...

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