Hinduism and Environmental Ethics: Law, Literature, and Philosophy by Christopher G. Framarin (review)

Comparative environmental philosophy is a relatively new discipline that came into existence in 1984 at the Institute for Comparative Philosophy at the University of Hawai’i.¹ The first book on the subject, Roger T. Ames and J. Baird Callicott’s Nature in Asian Traditions of Thought, grew out of this meeting, and since its release there have been only two other books to deal with the environmental thought of India, China, and Japan: Callicott’s monograph Earth’s Insights and his more recent anthology Environmental Philosophy in Asian Traditions of Thought.² The only book to deal specifically with Indian environmental ethics is an anthology by George Alfred James, Ethical Perspectives on Environmental Issues in India.³ Thus, Christopher Framarin’s Hinduism and Environmental Ethics: Law, Literature, and Philosophy breaks new ground in the field by being the first monograph to address the question of how Hindu philosophy can offer a coherent, systematic approach to environmental ethics.

Framarin begins with a concise introduction that neatly summarizes the argument of the book, which is broken into four major sections: a discussion of criteria for what constitutes an environmental ethic (chapter 1), a refutation of standard arguments given to support Hindu environmental ethics (chapters 2–4), an original argument in favor of Hindu environmental ethics drawn from several key texts in the tradition (chapters 5–8), and a conclusion (followed by an appendix on the jīvanmukta objection to the argument from pain, a list of references, and an index).

Chapter 1 offers a detailed analysis of what is meant by “environmental ethic.” A plausible environmental ethic, Framarin argues, must attribute direct moral standing to nature such that humans must consider nature for its own sake—and not just instrumentally—when they act. Framarin takes the term “nature” to refer to either nature as a whole, wholes in nature (e.g., ecosystems, species, or communities), or individual living things. The recognition that all three have value avoids the “environmental fascism” critique that is often leveled against holistic systems. Framarin does not equate moral standing with intrinsic value because the latter is notoriously difficult to prove and because it is possible for an entity to be worthy of moral consideration even though it might not have intrinsic value. Nonetheless, the concept of moral standing is sufficient for environmental ethics because it forces human agents to consider non-human entities as something other than pure means to an end, that is, their own satisfaction. Framarin then offers a thorough discussion of Richard Routley’s Last Person Argument to show why it is plausible that environmental ethics must attribute direct moral standing to nature. The Last Person Argument is not an environmental ethic per se, but it successfully demonstrates that the burden of proof is on the anthropocentrist who would deny that animals and plants deserve direct moral consideration.

Chapters 2-4 examine prevailing theories in Hindu environmental ethics. Chapter 2 focuses on instrumentalist interpretations, which claim that nature has value only as a means to some human end. The First Instrumentalist Interpretation argues that plants and animals have only extrinsic value because they can help human beings attain the ultimate end of mokṣa (spiritual liberation). This is problematic for two reasons. First, it relies on a circular argument: ahiṃsā (non-harm) produces merit because it leads to mokṣa, yet the only justification for why ahiṃsā promotes mokṣa is because it generates merit. This begs the question as to why there is a relation between ahiṃsā and merit to begin with, which the First Instrumentalist Interpretation cannot answer. If there is no fundamental connection between ahiṃsā and merit, we encounter a second problem: morality is arbitrary. Ahiṃsā just happens to promote mokṣa, but there is no reason why its opposite, harm, might not be conducive to liberation. Thus, the First Instrumentalist Interpretation can be rejected. The Second Instrumentalist Interpretation states that animals and plants have value...