Elusive Alliance: The German Occupation of Poland in World War I by Jesse Kauffman (review)

After seizing Russian Poland in 1915 and establishing the Government-General of Warsaw, planners in Berlin faced a daunting challenge. Germany’s success had reopened Europe’s “Polish question,” frozen since the Congress of Vienna had repartitioned the region between Russia, Prussia, and Austria. Hoping to secure their vulnerable eastern border, German elites considered influence over Poland essential, but worried that Polish nationalism would destabilize their future hegemony (19–20). Moreover, observers feared that instability in Congress Poland might enflame nationalist sentiment within Prussia’s Polish minority. Elusive Alliance examines Governor-General Hans Hartwig von Beseler’s attempt to find a regional arrangement that would satisfy both German security requirements and Polish national aspirations. Ultimately, Beseler departed from Prussia’s long-standing efforts to Germanize its eastern provinces and eschewed the radical annexations proposed by Pan-Germans. Instead, he called for the creation of a satellite kingdom from the territory of Congress Poland, autonomous in domestic governance and cultural policy, but subordinated to German leadership in foreign affairs and wartime military command (24).

This program is well known, but has often been dismissed as a ruse to entice Polish military enlistment (15). Berlin’s decision was not altruistic. Yet neither was Beseler’s policy a façade for colonial exploitation or future annexations, as previous interpretations have implied (5). Using the archival records of the Government-General and papers of key participants, Kauffman argues that German leaders saw value in concessions to Polish nationalism, and believed Beseler’s plan represented the most practical means of fortifying German security (75). Accordingly, his book details the Government-General’s wartime efforts to build a legitimate Polish government, military, and system of education.

The German Kaiser proclaimed the Kingdom of Poland in November 1916. Until the kingdom’s dissolution in November 1918, the occupation made sustained efforts to cultivate Polish self-governance. They installed Polish mayors and held municipal elections (108–11). The Government-General, aiming to produce a reliable administration, even assembled the Provisional Council of State as a nascent executive (84).

Plans for the Polish army reflected Beseler’s hopes for Poland in miniature. Polish officers were to lead the army, though in the event of war, it would be subordinated to Berlin’s command (74). The process of actually creating this army also exemplified the occupation’s frictions. Embarrassingly low enlistment in the army revealed Polish distrust of Germany’s intentions (81–82). Disagreements over command in the present war dragged Beseler’s administration into protracted conflict with the Provisional Council (93). When asked to pledge allegiance to both Poland and its German and Austro-Hungarian allies, many in the army mutinied (96). Beseler managed to salvage the training program, but plans to deploy a large Polish army during WWI were scuttled.

Restoring a Polish system of education was the centerpiece of Germany’s state-building project. The Government-General built a network of elementary schools and organized teacher-training programs (144). Curriculum, though overseen by German authorities, was remarkably Polish in content (149). Indeed, one of Beseler’s priorities was to encourage Polish nationalism, especially in its anti-Russian variants (51). Similarly, Beseler hoped that Warsaw’s reopened university and technical college would train compliant Polish leaders for the new state (174).

In each case, Kauffman describes a growing tension between Poles and their occupiers. Although residents embraced elections, they often unseated local collaborators, replacing them with National Democrats who were vocal opponents of German suzerainty (138). Germany’s support for Polish education was initially popular, but frustrated students organized large demonstrations against the occupation in 1917 and 1918 (184, 196). These tensions, Kauffman argues, were nearly impossible to avoid. Beseler’s project would have been difficult under the best conditions. Germany, however, was stained by past efforts to Germanize Prussia’s education system and land-ownership.. Moreover, wartime requisitions impoverished Poland and undercut any political gains that Beseler’s policies might have won (57...