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  • Twenty Years after Communism: The Politics of Memory and Commemoration ed. by Michael Bernhard and Jan Kubik
  • Nari Shelekpayev (bio)
Michael Bernhard and Jan Kubik (Eds.), Twenty Years after Communism: The Politics of Memory and Commemoration (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2014). 224 pp., ills. Bibliography. Subject Index. ISBN: 978-0-19-937514-1.

The Limits of Mnemonic Malleability

Collective volumes are rarely successful. Although purportedly unified by common premises or linked by similar theoretical approaches, not all such volumes succeed in conveying a coherent account of their topic. As a result, contributions may diverge sufficiently from one another so as to appear contingent, and conclusions, when offered, may range from the conciliatory to the obfuscatory. With some reservations, these pitfalls do not apply to a book edited by Michael Bernhard and Jan Kubik. The editors’ bold theoretical framework, clear methodology, and precise research questions thoroughly infuse each of the ten chapters on the twentieth anniversary of the 1989 revolutions in seventeen post-communist countries. All in all, the book not only focuses on mnemonic issues but also presents a broader panorama, spanning two decades, of political processes, identity formation, [End Page 368] and nation-building in Central and Eastern Europe.

Unlike history (which focuses on collective and individual memory and its construction at large) and sociology (which privileges the study of social mechanisms of remembrance), political science focuses on the “strategies that political actors employ to make others remember in certain, specific ways” while also considering “the effect of such mnemonic manipulations” (P. 7). Inasmuch as it may be said that political science lacks a systematic theoretical foundation, the editors claim to fill this gap through “a systematization of several theoretical motifs and a rigorous comparative study of seventeen cases coming from the post-communist world” (ibid.).

To this end, Bernhard and Kubik have constructed a complex theory that puts two central variables into play: mnemonic actors and mnemonic regimes. Mnemonic actors can be “warriors,” “pluralists,” “abnegators,” and/or “prospectives.” Their behavioral strategies (or practices) can be conditioned by positional (political) or cultural (semiotic) considerations. “Mnemonic warriors” tend to draw a sharp line between their own vision of the past (which is “true” and “nonnegotiable”) and the imperfect visions of others. “Mnemonic pluralists” are more open-minded toward others’ opinions and are ready to engage in discussions about the past with their opponents. In stark contrast to the pluralists, “mnemonic abnegators” are either uninterested in memory politics or simply resist involvement in it. One reason for this abnegation may be that dwelling on certain memory issues could be irrelevant given current social or political circumstances. Another reason may involve a conscious strategy of “purposive forgetting” (P. 14), one influenced by strategic or tactical choices. Finally, “mnemonic prospectives” assert that “they have solved the riddle of history and thus have the key to a better future” (P. 14). They tend to instrumentalize their vision of the future instead of imposing one rooted in the past. It should be noted that mnemonic prospectives are the least developed of Bernhard and Kubik’s ideal types – and also the least relevant to the cases they explore.

A memory regime is an organized way of remembering a specific issue, event, or process in a given moment in time. There are three types of memory regimes: fractured, pillarized, and unified; and each is dependent on positions that mnemonic actors may assume. Fractured regimes emerge when mnemonic warriors challenge a previously established version of past issues or processes and exploit collective memory to gain political points. Pillarized regimes are animated by [End Page 369] mnemonic pluralists and/or abnegators and generally permit contradictory visions of the past to coexist. In unified regimes “all actors are de facto abnegators” (P. 17). This can happen either because a high consensus regarding the past predominates or because politicizing the past is too dangerous. This being said, the editors recognize that memory actors do not always act according to previously established roles; abnegators on one issue can turn into warriors on another (P. 18). The authors also introduce a distinction between the structural and cultural constraints that the actors face and which...

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