Abstract

Abstract:

Autonomy is the property of individuals’ decisions that makes them immune to paternalistic interference. Conventionally, a decision is taken to be autonomous if and only if it is competent (rational and well informed) and voluntary (made by the agent herself). This theory of autonomy is ostensibly value-neutral, because competence and voluntariness are thought to be independent of the merits of the decision-maker’s values. I argue, however, that the non-autonomy of several classes of decisions (made by persons with anorexia nervosa, drug addiction, and depression, and by children) can be explained neither by incompetence nor by a value-neutral conception of voluntariness. Instead, if these decisions really are non-autonomous, it is because voluntariness, and so autonomy, can be undermined when a person’s values do not reflect accurately her own objective good. In such cases, autonomy is not as value-neutral as it may seem, and attempts to explicate the non-autonomy of these decisions in a value-neutral fashion seem to succeed largely insofar as their criteria are indirect evidence of inappropriate values.

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