Letters

Letters Readers’ comments on texts published in Leonurdo are welcomed. The Editors reserve the right to shorten letters. Letters should be written in English and sent to the Main Editorial Olfice. COMMENTS ON GOMBRICH ON ART VERSUS BRYSON ON ART I think that Ernst Gombrich may be spared the effort of taking issue with Norman Bryson’s examples (Leonardo 18, 126-127, 1985) as there is already a substantial body of literature which does just that. I am referring, of course, to the reviews in professional art historical journals. Readers of Leonardo who wish to pursue the matter can consult: J. J. L. Whitely, “The Trouble with Words”, Art Book Review 1, 39-40 (1982). R. Wrigley, “Word and Image.. .”, Art International 26, 82-83 (1983). C. Duncan, “Rediscovering the Known”, Art History 6, 246-248 (1983). A. Brookner, “Word and Image ...”, Burlington Magazine 125, 762-764 (1983). M. Podro, “Misconceived Alternatives ”, Art History 7 ,243-247 (1984). My own paper, whichcriticizesthefirst chapter of Word and Image, will be published as “Words and Pictures” inthe British Journal of Aesthetics at the end of 1986. Anyone tempted to believe Bryson’s claims about the present state of British art history should look through back copiesof thejournal Art History.Anyone tempted to believe his, or David Carrier’s, claimsabout Gombrich’s views should read Gombrich’s books. I would not like to be held responsible for the consequences of recommending Bryson’s books, but in fairness they should be read if an objective view is to be obtained. My own view is that much of what Bryson has said has been said before with greater cogency and clarity by other people. Although Bryson claimsto widen the scope of art history his bibliography makes very narrow reading, confined largely to a few fashionablefigures. I find the lack of reference to any material from thejournal Semiotica quiteextraordinary, as well as a lack of reference to semiotic conferences. I could go on but 1 won’t. Richard Woodfield Trent Polytechnic Nottingham NGI 4BU, U.K. COMMENTS ON THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES In his discussion of creativity and artificial intelligence(Leonardo19,77-80, 1986), David Carrier cites my recent study of CCzanne and calls attention to one of its major concerns, the incongruity of an artist’s practice and its associated theory or interpretation. Theory and interpretation often seem more normative or stable than the creative works that are their referents. This is so at least in terms of a cumulative historical effect, as a line of commentary on a given artist’s oeuvre becomes canonical. Yet the work remains elusive enough to allow innovation in criticism. As Carrier points out, the goal of artificial intelligence (AI) is to simulate the processesthatproducecreative works, rather than to imitate such works or to simulate some ‘intelligent’ evaluation of them. A1 is aiming for art in the purest sense. One of the provocative implications of Carrier’s discussion is that the success or failure of the A1 project might itself be impossible to criticize or evaluate. Indeed, the “computer simulation of creative thinking” is a contradiction ; either it cannot happen, or, if it did, we would not know that it did. Briefly,in my own terms, letmeexplain this point, as an addendum to Carrier’s argument. To the extent that A1seeks to create in the modem artistic sense, it seeks a certain originality (actually, two originalities). A1 strives to express both the originality we associate with individual difference (subjectivity) and the originality we associate with innovative , unprecedented achievement. But, if we follow the examples Carrier cites, A1 seems only to offer a third and ‘older’ kind of originality,the ‘originality’ or precedence of a first or proper solution. In other words, we regard the processes of A1 as creative only when we recognizein their products the very kinds of qualities and structures that already fit our preconceived, canonical notions of the creative and the original. This circularity may also characterize our evaluation of the products of human artistic creation. But our custom, for better or worse, is to deny the possibility of such a firm standard of evaluation and to reassert continually the incommensurability of creativity and its end products. As...