The Idea of the Symbol: Some Nineteenth Century Comparisons with Coleridge. M by Jadwiga Swiatecka O. P. (review)

Books 323 Scheffler reformulates this gambit in terms of the notion of ‘mention-selection’, that is, the idea that an inscription can be used to refer not only to its literal denoruro, but also to ‘mentions’ of its denoruru, e.g. to pictures or descriptions of them. He seems to attach more importance to this idea than it deserves. He concludes in the chapter on Vagueness that all predicates are open-textured on the grounds that, although they may be perfectly determinate with respect to their literal denofafu,there will always be room for indeterminacy in the things they mention-select. But the importation of the notion of mention-selection into the account of ambiguity would bejustified (ifat all) only by the conjunction of twofacts:(1) that it isnot obscure, and (2) that no better way has been found of accounting for an evident fact about language. There is no reason to import it gratuitously here, since (2) does not apply. As for the chapter on Metaphor, there is no more in this than the mereobservation that mention-selection is‘reminiscentof metaphor. Schefler’s discussion of metaphor is disappointing. Five possible approaches are reduced to the barest formulue and subjected to unsympathetip and often cursory criticism.A sixth, that of Goodman, is found to be promising, but isthen recast in a bizarre way. What seemsto be its most interesting feature, the viewthat predicates signifyasparts of systemsof predicates, and that when they are metaphorically applied to new realms of objectsthey, asit were, implicitlybring their wholesystem with them (a species of Structuralism), is virtually abandoned, to be replaced by something hardly discernible in the original-what Schefflercalls its Contextualism. The question how a word can signify metaphorically admits of no single answer: we are to attribute some predicate which is normally attributed to the usualdenorarumto the new denorarum; it is some clue in the individual context which will tell us which one. Metaphors We Live By, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson. Univ. Chicago Press, London, 1980. 241 pp. €7.50 ISBN: 0-226-46800-3. Reviewed by Mitchell Silver* Do our thoughts and words, when we think and speak truly, reflect an independent reality, or do we create and shape reality by the ways we think and speak?George Lakoff and Mark Johnson reject both theories, or, as they call them, ‘myths’. They believe that the ‘objectivist myth’ and the ‘subjectivistmyth’ havedominated Western thought for want of an alternative. In Meraphors We Live By they offer a third myth, the ‘experientialistmyth’. The authors argue that it is a considerably better myth than either of the old options. Lakoff and Johnson claim that the inadequacies of objectivism and subjectivism are made apparent by their inability to account for metaphors. This is especially true of objectivism, which they see as providing the basis of most contemporary philosophy of language and linguistics. Current theories of language view metaphor as a peripheral phenomenon of language. Lakoff and Johnson argue that metaphors are not only pervasivein language, but are formative of our conceptual systems, values, actions and, ultimately, the very realities we inhabit. For Lakoff and Johnson ‘the essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another.’ Most of our understanding and experience is of this type. But not all. Thereare some experiences whose features are clear enough to be directly comprehended, more or less. Concepts which ‘emerge’ from these clearly delineated experiences are used to conceptualize vaguer experiences. For example, we conceive of LOVE by seeing it as a JOURNEY. As such, a love relationship can come ro a crossroads. founder, be on the rocks, be going nowhere, and the loversmay havetogo theirseparute wuys. Not onlydoesthe metaphor LOVEIS A JOURNEY enable us to conceiveof love, it also defines what loveisfor us and helps determine how we behavetowards it. But a singlemetaphor renders only partial understanding. There are aspects of the love experience not captured by the journey metaphor. Hence we also have LOVE IS MADNESS -one can becrazy about one’sbeloved and ruveabout him constantly. LOVE ISA PHYSICAL FORCE -sparksfly, elecrriciryis generated, lovers gruvirare toward each other, momentum is lost. LOVE IS WAR, wherein advances ore repelled, conquests made, and...