Main Trends of Research in the Social and Human Sciences: Anthropological and Historical Sciences, Aesthetics and the Sciences of Art ed. by Jacques Havet (review)

248 Books that a referential relationship between two things IS not enough for one to be a symbol of the other. For example, I can refer to me, but it does not symbolize me; the term horse can refer to mammal. but horse does not symbolize mammal; and a painting of a tree can refer to a tree, but it does not symbolize a tree. While each of these examples involves reference, the term reference is not synonymous with symbol. Symbols may provide reference, but anything that provides reference is not necessarily a symbol. The confusion on this distinction leads to a rather inclusive and vague notion of symbols by Goodman, and it results in some problems that are similar to those inherent in Suzanne Langer’s notion of expressive symbols, which has been criticized strongly by Ernest Nagel. The lack of clarity in the use of the term symbol, however, does not undermine Goodman’s contention that verbal and nonverbal symbols influence one’s conceptions of the world. The different kinds of symbolsdescribed by Goodman provide one with alternative frames ofreference for conceiving the world. In making decisions about the world as viewed through the use of symbols, he says, ‘We must distinguish falsehood and fiction from truth and fact; but we cannot , , .do it on the grounds that fiction is fabricated and fact is found.’ Rather, one must consider the versions that one has of the facts ‘for facts, after all, are obviously factitious’. They are based on conceptions of the world. Thus, worlds are made through symbols that are used to provide versions of it, and the study of worldmaking must account for the alternative versions that have been developed. For Goodman, the acceptability of a version is contingent on the world that it fits. We can ‘either reject one or two ostensibly conflicting versions as false, or take them as true in different worlds, or find, if we can, another way of reconciling them’. In order to show whether two versions are of the same world or different worlds, one must show how they fit together. Whether one says that a table is an object made of wood or of moleculesor whether a picture is a painting or paint on a canvas depends on the system of conceptualization for each. The correctness of this fit is anchored in the traditions associated with different world views. In deciding whether a picture is ‘correct’ in how it represents reality, one can rely on European conventions for representation with which one is familiar. For example, one can consider a Diirer woodcut correct that represents an artist making a rendering in geometric perspective. However, the same picture could be considered ‘incorrect’ according to a different system for rendering space. For Goodman, the correctness of fit is of greater concern than the truth. Since there is not a world uncolored by one’s traditions and conceptions, ‘knowing and understanding [are] seen as ranging beyond the acquiringof true beliefs to the discovery and devising of fits of all sorts ... ’ between versions and world views. This is the way in which I think one should consider Goodman’sview of thesymbols,truth and correctness. But, what worlds fit Goodman’s version? Moreover, if one finds a fit for Goodman’s views or the views of others, how is one to decide among versions that fit world views? Certainly, all versions that fit do not have the same utility in accounting for worlds, and worlds do not have the same utility in accounting for versions. Thus, Goodman leaves readers with a puzzle, but it is a puzzle produced by a stimulating look at the assumptions about the world and the symbols that influence one’s conception of it. Goodman’s account should be useful for both artists and teachers who have an interest in theoretical views of art. Indeed, after reading his book, one can no longer simply assume that art is external or separate from versions and world views of it. The Myth of Metaphor. Colin M. Turbayne. Univ. So. Carolina Press, 1970. 241 pp., illus. Reviewed by Carl R. Hausmann* In this revision of Turbayne’s book are added two brief Forewords, in...