Astrology and Modern Science Revisited

Leonardo, Vol. 7, pp. 235-237. Pergamon Press 1974. Printed in Great Britain ASTROLOGY AND MODERN SCIENCE REVISITED James R. Barth* and James T. Bennett* Lawrence E. Jerome [l] has attacked astrology as a science on the grounds that ‘there can be no scientificvalidity in the methods and predictions of astrology, since astrology originated as a magical system and the passage of some 6000 years has not altered the fallacious assumptions upon which it rests’. In rebuttal to this argument, James R. Hein [2] has asserted that the ‘critical analysis’ provided by Jerome is severely deficient because (1) his assumptions were unjustified and an inaccurate depiction of reality, and (2) he offers no empirical evidence in defense of his position (cf. also [3, 41). We wish to comment on the views of both Jerome and Hein, as well as offer some empirical evidence regarding the predictive content of astrology. Prior to the assessment of our empirical evidence, however , we briefly discuss the content and testing of a positive science and offer some insights into the role of assumptions in ascertaining the validity of scientific theory. According to Milton Friedman in his Essays in PosifiveEconomics: ‘Theultimate goal of a positive science is the development of a “theory” or “hypothesis” that yields valid and meaningful (i.e. not truistic) predictions about phenomena not yet observed. Such a theory is, in general, a complex intermixture of two elements. In part, it is a “language” designed to promote “systematic and organized methods of reasoning”. In part, it is a body of substantive hypotheses designed to abstract essential features of complex reality’ [5, p. 71. And, further, he says: ‘Viewed as a body of substantive hypotheses, theory is to be judged by its predictive power for the class of phenomena which it is intended to “explain”. Only factual evidence can show whether it is “right” or “wrong” or, better, tentatively “accepted” as valid or “rejected”. [Tlhe only relevant test of the validity of a hypothesis is comparison of its predictions with experience. The hypothesis is rejected if its predictions are contradicted (“frequently” or more often than predictions from an alternative hypothesis); it is accepted if its * Dept. of Economics, George Washington University, Washington, D.C. 20006, U.S.A. (Received 22 February 1974.) predictions are not contradicted ; great confidence is attached to it if it has survived many opportunities for contradiction’ [5, pp. 8-91. In the foregoing statements of Friedman, one should carefully note that there is no reference to the source of the theory, its historical underpinnings or its assumptions. With regard to the validity of the assumptions of a theory, Friedman has asserted that: ‘In so far as a theory can be said to have “assumptions” at all, and in so far as their realism can be judged independently of the validity of predictions, the relation between the significance of a theory and the “realism” of its “assumptions” is almost the opposite of that suggested . . . . Truly important and significant hypothesis will be found to have “assumptions” that are wildly inaccurate descriptive representations of reality and, in general, the more significant the theory, the more unrealistic the assumptions (in this sense). The reason is simple. A hypothesis is important if it “explains” much by little, that is, if it abstracts the common and crucial elements from the mass of complex and detailed circumstances surrounding the phenomena to be explained and permits valid predictions on the basis of them alone. To be important, therefore, a hypothesis must be descriptively false in its assumptions ; it takes account of, and accounts for, none of the many other attendant circumstances, since its very success shows them to be irrelevant for the phenomena to be explained. ‘To put this point less paradoxically, the relevant question to ask about the “assumptions” of a theory is not whether they are “realistic”, for they never are, but whether they are sufficiently good approximations for the purpose in hand’ [5, pp. 14-15]. There is ample evidence that much ‘science’ has been based upon and derived from mysticism and religious fanaticism. Both Newton and Kepler, for example, are regarded as great scientists. Kepler’s three Laws of Planetary Motion, however , were derived...