Seven Theories of Human Nature by Leslie Stevenson (review)

Leonardo, Vol. 9, pp. 332-347. Pergamon Press 1976. Printed in Great Britain BOOKS Readers are inviied to recommend books io be reviewed. Zn general, only books in English and in French can be reviewed ai ihis stage. Those who would like io be added io Leonardo’s panel of reviewers should wriie to ihe Founder-Ediior, indicaiing their pariicular interests. Modem Man Looks at Evolution. W. W. Fletcher. Collins, London, 1974. 176 pp., illus. E2.50.Studiesin the Philosophy of Biology: Reduction and Related Problems. Francisco Jose Ayah and Theodosius Dobzhansky, eds. Macmillan, London, 1974. 390 pp. E12.00. Reviewed by David Mandel* The first book tells with clarity and simplicity the story of evolution, as presently understood, from the beginning of the universe to human beings and the author also speculates on aspects of the future. It is intended for secondary school students and the general public. Still unraveled problems, like that of vitalism and reductionism, are not touched on, but the basic changes that the Earth and humans have undergone are clearly set forth. I found the last chapter, The Way Ahead, the most interesting . Here one can read about the value of science, for example in conquering diseases. The woes that lie ahead are also touched upon, such as the population explosion and pollution problems (there is no mention of the dangers of utilizing nuclear energy). While not suggesting that humans may take charge of their own further evolution, Fletcher does believe that their destiny could be shaped by their acts. The second book is of a very differentkind. Eighteen of the world‘sleadingbiologistsgathered togetheratThe Rockefeller Foundation Study and Conference Center at Bellagio, Italy, in September 1972for the fourth of a series of meetings there on current problems of biology. The sub-title ‘Reduction and Related Problems’ gave the meeting a unifying base. The Conference was organized by the late Theodosius Dobzhansky and by Francisco J. Ayala, who acted as editors of the proceedings. A symposium on this subject was organized at Alpbach, Austria, in 1968 by Arthur Koestler and J. P. Smythies and the papers presented were published in the book Beyond Reduciionism (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971). Both meetings dealt with the dispute between reductionist and organismic biologists. Dobzhansky states in the first paragraph of Introductory Remarks in the book under review: ‘Most biologists, I believe all those gathered round this table, are reductionists to the extent that we see life as a highly complex, highly special, and highly improbable pattern of physical and chemical processes. To me this is “reasonable” reductionism. But should we go farther, and insist that biology must be so reduced to chemistry that biological laws and regularities could be deduced from what we shall learn about the chemistry of life processes? This, I think, is “unreasonable” reductionism. The most spectacular advancesin biology in our time were unquestionably those in molecular biology. Yet it does not follow that organismic biology is from now on unproductive, or that all of us should work exclusivelyonmolecularbiology.’This viewissupported in the papers presented, for example, by G. Montalenti (City Univ. of Rome), who says: ‘Therefore at each level of integration new principles become active. ...This is the point where reductionism fails.’ Ernest Boesiger (Univ. of Montpellier, France) in his paper says: ‘Somebiologists have in recent years denied the usefulness of this sic populational *Law Office, Perth Amboy National Bank Bldg., 313 State St., Perth Amboy, NJ 08861, U.S.A. organismic and synthetic views and research trends. This symposium is a good occasion to insist once more on the importance and necessity of the organismic point of view in biology.’ K. R. Popper (Penn, Bucks,. England) insists that emergent evolution cannot be reduced to explanations based on physics and chemistry alone. There was a long discussion after the last paper, which was presented by J. Monod (Pasteur Institute, Paris). His recent book, Chance and Necessity (New York: Knopf, 1971) seemed to me and to some of the participants to be a determined defenseof reductionism. He was strongly attacked, for example, by H. Skolimowski(Univ. of Michigan,Ann Arbor, Mich.). Rather surprisingly, Monod replied: ‘I do not believe in reductionism.’ The papers presented at this Symposium...