Abstract

Chaucer’s Parliament of Fowls muses upon the relation between knowing and desiring, and in so doing, raises questions about the respective roles of the intellect and the will in determining moral action. Reflecting the influence of late medieval voluntarism, the dream vision challenges the classical/Thomistic view that moral virtue results from reason’s prudent judgments. Representing a host of avian and human agents motivated by “wil, and herte, and thought” (417), the dream vision asks readers not only to evaluate the rational and affective forces shaping different acts of choice, but also to note the limitations of reason. The bookish narrator’s recurrent missteps point to the potential inefficacy of prudent reason, demonstrating that individuals often act against their better judgment. By contrast, the formel’s resistance to Reason may signal the moral limits of that faculty, since it lacks the will’s receptivity to divine grace.

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