Abstract

Whether the metaphysical commitments of Madhyamaka Buddhism afford a satisfactory justificatory ground for moral judgments is investigated here. Finnigan and Tanaka (2011) argue that they do not. Their argument has since been challenged by Tillemans (2010–2011), who alleges that both Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamikas can readily justify moral judgments by respective appeal to the doctrine of the two truths. This claim is contested here with respect to Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka. Several arguments are provided to show that Prāsaṅgika cannot satisfactorily justify their moral judgments by appeal to the notion of conventional truth.

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Additional Information

ISSN
1529-1898
Print ISSN
0031-8221
Pages
pp. 765-785
Launched on MUSE
2015-09-03
Open Access
No
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