Warpaths: Travels of a Military Historian in North America by John Keegan (review)

Book Reviews 167 naive as to assume that the public would put aside its concerns over the huge costs and, however irrational, environmental risks involved in purchasing atomic-powered submarines is not explQred. Neither is there any discussion of the paradox of submarines: They are the most effective naval vessels in war because of their invisibility, but it is this invisibility that makes them the least effective in peacetime. Despite recent photographs of Spanish trawlers taken through submarine periscopes , these vessels are far less useful then either surface ships or aircraft at sovereignty protection in peacetime or in the control of shipping. The exception to this rule is under the Arctic ice, another important issue not explored here. With these serious problems, the book can not be highly recommended to those interested in the question of the submarine's role in Canada's defence. Its wonderful accounts of the heroism of wartime submariners, however, can provide some delightful reading. DAVID ZIMMERMAN University of Victoria Warpaths: Travels of a Military Historian in North America. JOHN KEEGAN . Toronto: Key Porter Books 1995. Pp. xiv, 370, illus. $34·95 Warpaths is neither conventional military history nor typical Keegan, but 'part military history and part travel.' As travel literature it has serious shortcomings. Keegan's impressions ofthe United States, based on extensive travel over the years, are nostalgic and uncritical. As a boy, Keegan fell in love with America. It is obvious that the flame still burns brightly. Canada, in contrast, is portrayed as a kinder America, a North Atlantic New Zealand comfortable with its British institutions and social programs. Quebec City, 'a distinctively French place,' reminiscent of the France of Keegan's youth, is described as 'comprehending the whole history of a people.' Such assertions seem inappropriate for a historian of Keegan's breadth of experience. ' The 'military' portion of this book stands on more solid ground. Keegan believes 'there is no substitute, in the writing of military history, for going to see for oneself.' From extensive travels across North America visiting the major battle grounds, he has concluded that 'geography and military history have come to explain each other in North America as they do nowhere in the world.' He sets out to demonstrate this theme by examining the military history of the continent from the French regime until the closing of the American West. Keegan sees the network of fortifications spread across North America as an essential key to explaining the military and human 168 The Canadian Historical Review geography of the continent. His point is that fortifications were intended to dominate strategic territory and control access, something that Champlain and his successors understood. By the late seventeenth century, French fortifications controlled the St Lawrence-Great Lakes-Mississippi River systems, confining English America to the Atlantic coast. But, in the end, want of numbers and inadequate naval strength cost France an American empire. England easily seized the major gateways - Duquesne, Louisbourg, and Quebec - and reduced what remained of New France piecemeal. British strategy during the American Revolution failed for the same reasons. Commanding the critical St Lawrence-Great Lakes line and the key Atlantic ports, the British expected to mount successful attacks against the hinterland, engage Washington's inexperienced army in decisive battle, and bring the revolution to a speedy end. But the British failed to control effectively the vast distances that encompassed America or to dominate its strategic points. Possession of Canada did not offer the strategic advantage expected, and the British lost the hinterland. French entry into the war after Saratoga challenged the Royal Navy's absolute command of the sea around America. By 1781, the natural boundaries of the theatre of operations and its key approaches were in enemy hands. At the critical moment, Clinton was confined in New York, unable to aid a trapped Cornwallis. Yorktown was the result. The South at the opening of the Civil War also had strong natural frontiers, a secure coastline, control over the Mississippi, and a formidable obstacle - the Appalachians - at its back. And yet it was to lose the war. Keegan argues convincingly that the South should have fought a defensive war, but was driven to the offensive by an...