Abstract

The proper relationship between phenomenology and naturalism has reemerged as a pressing issue following interdisciplinary developments in the cognitive sciences. Most solutions opt for a naturalized phenomenology, rather than a phenomenological naturalism. This article takes up the latter approach, confronting the implications of Merleau-Ponty’s reformulation of Husserl’s paradox of subjectivity. I argue that Merleau-Ponty’s formulation—which I term “the paradox of madness”—reveals a deep, ontological contingency in what Husserl took to be necessary transcendental structures of consciousness and world, revealing that these transcendental structures are in fact embedded in and contaminated by the very world they constitute and disclose.

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Additional Information

ISSN
1527-9383
Print ISSN
0891-625X
Pages
pp. 291-301
Launched on MUSE
2015-08-11
Open Access
No
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