The Path to the Berlin Wall: Critical Stages in the History of Divided Germany by Manfred Wilke, trans. by Sophie Perl (review)

This year and last we mark the twenty-fifth anniversaries of German reunification and the fall of the Berlin Wall, respectively. Therefore, the 2014 English translation of Manfred Wilke’s book is timely indeed. This is the first in a five-part series on the Berlin Wall titled, “Publications of the Berlin Wall and Flight to the West” sponsored by the Berlin Wall Foundation (Siftung Berliner Mauer). The series itself grew out of a three-year long research project co-directed by the book’s author, Manfred Wilke. Covering the period from the end of World War II to the Cuban Missile Crisis, Wilke’s book adds detail and nuance to this story, rather than advancing any groundbreaking thesis.

In this detailed book, Wilke paints a picture of an East Germany suffering a crisis of legitimacy as a result of the 17 June 1953 uprising. For Wilke, “the crisis was not solved by repressing the revolt, but rather shelved and stored away” (p. 4). Its enduring legacy was the continued emigration of the East German population throughout the 1950s, a process that Walter Ulbricht consistently and cunningly referred to as “human trafficking.” The increasingly urgent financial crisis facing the German Democratic Republic (gdr) further compounded the situation. By November 1960, therefore, it was clear to Ulbricht that the ever-quickening exodus of East Germans could not be stemmed through policy alone; only a physical barrier could halt it.

As Wilke so precisely demonstrates, the decision to build the Berlin Wall was not Ulbricht’s to make; he required the support of the Soviet Union to close the border. The author stresses the impact of the June 1961 Vienna Summit between US President Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev as key in convincing the Soviet leader to give Ulbricht this support. Until this point, Khrushchev still hoped to achieve a peace treaty with the Western powers to resolve the “Germany Question.” The peace treaty he envisioned included transforming Berlin into a “Free City” which would require Britain, France, and the United States to relinquish their claims on West Berlin. Wilke argues that at the Vienna Summit, Kennedy’s unequivocal refusal to consider such a treaty convinced Khrushchev that some other solution must be found. Though Ulbricht had advocated sealing the Berlin border since 1960, it was not until Khrushchev’s hopes for a peace treaty were irreversibly dashed that he acquiesced to Ulbricht’s request. Less than a month after Ulbricht was notified of this decision, the border was sealed.

The speed with which the border was subsequently sealed demonstrates both Ulbricht’s desperation and his dependence on Khrushchev’s support. Wilke further underlines the gdr’s dependence on the Soviet Union by drawing attention to the fact that for Ulbricht, the Berlin Wall was meant to be merely the first step toward sovereignty. In contrast, it was the last step for Khrushchev. Despite continually promising Ulbricht that the gdr would begin gaining sovereignty rights imminently, Khrushchev was reluctant to follow through. He was held back by the fact that the gdr was not strong enough to stand on its own and if it collapsed the Soviet Union’s most important buffer in the west would disappear. Though the Soviet Union undeniably dominated the relationship, Wilke’s study highlights the interdependence of the gdr and the Soviet Union.

By situating the decision to seal the Berlin border within the broader history of the Second Berlin Crisis, Wilke emphasizes the very real threat of nuclear war during this period. He convincingly shows that in an attempt to persuade the Western powers to sign a peace treaty, Khrushchev consistently threatened to incite war over Berlin, and that in response to Khrushchev’s belligerence Kennedy increased the US defense budget, further exacerbating the tension. Khrushchev ultimately defused this threat, however, when he...