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  • The War Has Brought Peace to Mexico: World War II and the Consolidation of the Post-Revolutionary State by Halbert Jones
  • John J. Dwyer
The War Has Brought Peace to Mexico: World War II and the Consolidation of the Post-Revolutionary State. By Halbert Jones. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2014. Pp. xv, 296. Illustrations. Acknowledgments. Abbreviations. Notes. Bibliography. Index. $55.00 cloth.

Halbert Jones’s book on Mexican domestic and international history during the Second World War is thoroughly researched. Based on materials from three countries and 17 different depositories, Jones convincingly shows that the administration of Manuel Ávila Camacho (1940–1946) strengthened the power of the presidency and advanced the consolidation of the Mexican state during the early to mid 1940s. Unlike his predecessors since 1910, President Ávila Camacho was able to unite opposing liberal and conservative factions, long-standing political opponents, and the general public. Such unity allowed his government to moderate revolutionary agendas; it also fostered Mexican political stability, strengthened the government’s security apparatus, and [End Page 513] augmented the PRI’s political domination and authoritarianism in the post-WWII era. Since Ávila Camacho, according to Jones, played a pivotal role in shaping mid-to-late twentieth-century Mexico, the unstudied president deserves further scholarly attention.

Jones ably demonstrates how Ávila Camacho pulled off this significant achievement soon after the reformist and ideologically charged administration of Lázaro Cárdenas (1934–1940). By emphasizing the threats to Mexican security posed by saboteurs and spies, and noting the economic opportunities presented by the global war, Ávila Camacho “ingeniously” and “miraculously” convinced Mexicans of all stripes to put aside their differences and unite behind his government and the Allied war effort. Creating such national unity was no easy task; most Mexicans preferred to remain neutral and many were skeptical about helping the “colossus of the north.”

How did Ávila Camacho achieve the seemingly impossible in such a polarized political environment? Simply by giving opposing sides what they wanted. By declaring himself “a believer” the president indicated that the anti-ecclesiastical policies of his predecessors would come to an end—thereby gaining the Church’s support. After the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, the president pursued a harder line against the Axis, which the Mexican left had been calling for. Because Ávila Camacho’s pro-Allied foreign policy gained the support of labor unions, he was able to pursue conservative economic policies at home, giving him the support of the nation’s industrialists, landowners, and right-wing organizations.

This argument is hardly new, but Jones stands out in his perceptive analysis of Ávila Camacho’s policy-making procedures. The president avoided a political backlash against both his foreign and domestic policies by repeatedly assuring his nation that Mexico’s contribution to the war would be limited. In addition to taking care to move slowly and cautiously on all fronts, Ávila Camacho took advantage of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in late 1941, as well as the German sinking of two Mexican commercial ships in mid-1942, to prod the public into accepting more responsibility through civil defense initiatives and compulsory military service, while at the same time remaining unified behind his government. Coincidentally, Ávila Camacho’s dull personality produced few headlines and facilitated the president’s “quiet shifts” in policy both overseas and at home. According to Jones, proof of Ávila Camacho’s success was demonstrated in the outpouring of national pride following the return in 1945 of Mexico’s largely symbolic Expeditionary Air Force, which had flown combat missions over the Philippines late in the war.

Unfortunately, this study does have a few shortcomings. Besides its awkward title, the book is light on theory and simply marches chronologically through five years of Mexican political and diplomatic history in a textbook-like manner. Also, because the author’s central argument appears anew in every chapter, the book becomes repetitive. Further, two glaring omissions are Ávila Camacho’s agreement with Washington to allow thousands of Mexican nationals residing in the United States to be drafted into the US armed forces as noncombatants. Readers would likely want to know [End Page 514...

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