The history of the Israeli intelligence community during the 1950s and its relationship with the political leadership is discussed in the literature mainly from the perspective of the “Unfortunate Affair”. This article explains this “missing dimension” by examining Sharett’s attitude towards AMAN (Military Intelligence) during 1953–1956. It describes and explains the way Sharett used the intelligence estimate concerning the implications of the Egyptian-Czech arms deal and the problem of infiltration. The study demonstrates that Sharett’s attitude towards AMAN became different under the leadership of Yehoshafat Harkabi when compared with Binyamin Gibli’s tenure as head of AMAN. It presents the relationship Sharett had with Harkabi as an ideal interaction between the political leader and the intelligence provider, a situation that reflects personal trust and professional appreciation between the leader and the intelligence provider.


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pp. 77-101
Launched on MUSE
Open Access
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