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book reviews 601 Historians of medieval religion (not just historians of women religious ) will no doubt find this book useful as it illuminates the workings of canon law attempting to shape the lives of those reshaping religious life in the later Middle Ages. Katherine L. Jansen Department of History Catholic University of America Washington, D.C. THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE INTEGRAL REORDERING OF CANON LAW by Patricia Smith, O.S.F. Roman Catholic Studies Volume 16. Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2002. A group of Catholics recently posted on their web page the statement, “The pope forbids the ordination of homosexuals.” Further research determined that the quote derived from a 1959 document approved by Pope John XXIII, and directed to religious institutes. While the web-page statement has other difficulties, it does raise the specific issue of the legal status of previous norms—be they issued five years ago, forty years ago, or a hundred years ago. This fine study by Smith provides an important tool to assist in answering the question of legal status and specifically the question in reference to religious law. The text, a welcome addition to the Roman Catholic Studies series published by the Edwin Mellen Press, examines canon 6, §1, 20 and 40 as key determinatives as to whether or not a particular juridic norm (understood broadly) issued prior to the current Code of Canon Law remains part of the ius vigens. Canon 6 distinguishes “direct contrariety” and “integral reordering.” The former—direct contrariety—is clearer: a previous norm cannot coexist with a norm found in the code. The latter, integral reordering, is less obvious and therefore the process of determining the force of a particular norm is much more complex. The study progresses through three chapters; in the first, the author examines the concept of “integral reordering” in the Codes of 1917, of 1983, and the 1990 Code of the Eastern churches. In this chapter, the author also presents a “hierarchy of juridic documents” necessary to interpretation , a hierarchy implicit in canons 29–34 and developed in the work of scholars, especially John Huels. In the second chapter, the author focuses on the theoretical dimension—that is, on the principles utilized to determine if a particular norm has in fact been integrally reordered. The third chapter—the practical dimension—applies the material developed in the first two chapters to specific texts issued prior to the code to determine their current legal status. In this chapter, the author looks at such documents as Cum admotae, Religionum laicalium; Venite seorsum ; Verbi sponsa and Mutuae relationes among others (including examples of norms which have been explicitly revoked such as Ecclesiae Sanctae). The author describes integral reordering of law as “its tacit revocation by a later law that treats anew the entire matter of the earlier law, thus resulting in an incompatibility between the two laws” (p. 4). Through her text, the author demonstrates that such reordering may but does not necessarily affect an entire document. Individual norms within a document such as Mutuae relationes might be integrally reordered and thus no longer have binding force, while other norms have not been so reordered and thus remain a part of the ius vigens. The author provides an appendix listing the results of her analysis of specific norms of Mutuae relationes concerned with religious law; the analysis determines whether the norm has been revoked through integral reordering or remains part of the ius vigens (this category would include norms whose revocation is doubtful ). The limitations of the analysis did not allow for an examination of other norms found in Mutuae relationes concerned with bishops or with the Code of Canon Law other than religious law. The author notes that this work was originally presented as a doctoral dissertation; consequently, some limitations associated with a dissertation remain when such a work is published. For example, a dissertation must argue its conclusion in light of evidence presented; nothing may be presumed. This can contribute to a certain density of material and information absent from other academic works. The work itself is directed more to the expert in law who must know the ius vigens. Nonetheless, the study makes an...

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