Objects, Exchanges, Discourse

Philosophy is a reflection for which all unknown material is good, and we would gladly say, for which all good material must be unknown.

—George Canguilhem, The Normal and the Pathological

This paper may be presented in two ways: it is a matter of understanding, locally, how legal institutions or economic discourses, which propose models of exchange between agents in society, can take into account sexuality in the way that it has been explored by psychoanalysis. It is thus a matter of following and transforming the efforts of Freud in Civilization and Its Discontents and of Lacan in his seminar, The Other Side of Psychoanalysis, in order to consider how the field of unconscious sexuality manages or doesn’t manage to develop thanks to these institutions. Inversely, it is a matter of specifying how institutional creations such as the rituals of the gift, the juridical system, or economic laws put “values” into play that implicate sexual desires. But before developing this question, I will first give some clarification about the method I will employ, or rather, offer some remarks concerning the philosophical background that this apparently “local” question presupposes.

Philosophical Background

This project could perhaps be said to share the same philosophical approach as that of Michel Foucault: it is not a question of constructing a system in the name of an idea of truth which would be the unifying foundation (in this case, sexual and political), but rather of intervening at a neurological point in “our” situation, which demands that one determine how this “our” comes into being. The point of departure for any theoretical project is always entangled in a situation that it subsequently problematizes. Instead of masking the situation that forces us to think by the means that are proper to the system’s own constitution, the strategy that I have called “local” allows for the concepts to take into account the very situation from out of which they are produced as a theoretical framework. Deleuze wrote that an event forces us to think that which, at first, can only be felt and, more precisely, felt as a fact impossible to integrate into a ready-made set of concepts. Foucault redefined critique as the diagnosis of a present: the thinker experiences a situation in a way that puts her at a distance and displaces her. This experience is transformed into an occasion to produce knowledge as well as a practice that allows it to be “thought,” not as a subjective experience, but rather as new objects for knowledge of which this experience of distance was not merely the occasion.

It has already been a long time (1990) since I showed, using Kant as an example, that the invention of a philosophy is connected to an event at once present in the texts and concealed by its very systematicity; critical and transcendental philosophy was only possible by the ingenious articulation of heterogenous factors. Deleuze called this “a contingent reason” because of the heterogeneity among the concepts that construct a philosophical problematic. For example, here, the critique of the formalism of logic is the conceptual means with which Kant transformed the event, which was for him his fascination-repulsion for a “delirious” [délirant] thinker, namely, Swedenborg, into a new concept of metaphysics, the “science of the limits of human reason” and a transcendental logic of objectivity.

Conceptually, the link he would forge was that of the confrontation between the mad system of Swedenborg and the philosophical idealism of Leibniz. The logical instrument of Leibnizian criticism defined a new kind of negation, the “real conflict,” which bears this name since it introduces the determination of a real object (realer Widerstreit), in contrast to three other kinds of negation: contradiction, which, in negating that which forms within thought, negates at the same time that to which it could refer (nihil negativum); “the being of reason” like the Leibnizian god or the spirits of Swedenborg, which are not contradictory concepts, but instead concepts for which one could not find any correlate in spatiotemporal experience, such that one cannot “count them among the possible things” (ens rationis). Finally, there...