Provinces as bulwarks: centrifugal forces within the ANC

This paper traces the evolution of provincial government in South Africa from the constitutional compromise between the ANC and National Party in 1994. During the last 20 years, the constitutional provision ensuring an ‘equitable share’ of fiscal resources to the provinces has created patronage relationships at that level. Because this fiscal system is not linked to performance, there are few incentives to promote effective financial management at provincial level. Furthermore, legislative oversight of public spending in the provinces is relatively weak, due to ANC structures acting as a ‘shadow government’, influencing government appointments and expenditures. Increasingly, provincial ANC elites act as king-makers at national level. There is little interest in expanding provincial powers, functions, or policy-making discretion. Provincialism in South Africa is a product of fiscal flows and political interests, and not of any federalist ideology. This creates an inexorable centrifugal dynamic. Nevertheless, there are increasingly effective administrative oversight mechanisms within key agencies such as the presidency and the Public Service Commission, which constrain this centrifugal momentum, creating a system in tension with itself.