An Uneasy Equilibrium: The Coordination of Climate Governance in Federated Systems

With the prospects for reaching a binding international treaty on emissions mitigation seemingly remote, global climate governance in the near to mid-term future is likely to rely on bottom-up accretion of domestic efforts and initiatives. This opens up new possibilities but also raises questions about the ability of states to produce collective action internally. This is especially so in federated systems where shared jurisdictional authority and divergent interests present barriers to coordinated action. While political will, leadership, and public pressure are necessary conditions, each prioritizes the “whether” and marginalizes the “how.” This article focuses on the latter, exploring how domestic climate governance emerges from the intersection of three archetypal modes of coordination—coercion, competition, and collaboration—and arguing that bringing and holding together these three modes is essential to achieve, and sustain effective coordinated governance. Two cases—Canada and Australia—each with a common coordination challenge but divergent coordination outcomes, illustrate the analytic leverage that can be gained by adopting this approach.