The Moral Disadvantage of Unbelief: Natural Religion and Natural Sanctity in Aquinas

Introduction

Thomists debate whether according to Aquinas our knowledge of the natural law presupposes belief in the existence of God, and thus whether unbelief renders a person incapable of consistently accepting the natural law or even of living according to it. The approach often taken to answer this question¹ is to examine whether belief in God is a necessary presupposition of Aquinas’s natural law theory, especially as expressed in his questions on law and the natural law.² This paper, however, will take a new and less direct, yet perhaps more revealing, approach towards settling the question, based on Aquinas’s virtue ethics:³ this paper asks whether for Aquinas the life of natural virtue necessarily includes the practice of religion. For Aquinas, the virtue of religion is a moral virtue that inclines us to perform religious actions, such as worship, prayer, and sacrifice, as an attempt to pay God His due. I shall argue that the necessity of such a virtue for living a full moral life implies that Aquinas’s natural law ethics require belief in God.

I shall glean my argument from the texts of Aquinas, primarily from the IIa-IIae, and shall present it in two stages, corresponding to the two sections of this paper. Emphasizing the religious finality of the life of the natural virtues, in the first section (1) I shall show how for Aquinas the virtue of religion, which inclines man to give to God the worship that is due to Him, is not only a legitimate natural virtue that is annexed to justice, but is actually the highest moral virtue, and is therefore quite necessary for a full life of natural virtue. In the second section (2) I shall argue that religion, as a “general” virtue (under which aspect Aquinas calls it “sanctity”), has the role of “commanding” or ordering all other moral virtues towards its own, religious ends, thus giving the whole system of moral virtues a single finality and unity. Using this indirect approach, therefore, I ultimately defend the view that for Aquinas without the practice of religion (and thus without belief in God) one cannot fulfill the natural law or live to the full a life of natural virtue. In addressing the question of whether morality must be grounded in belief in God according to Aquinas, I am doing a textual study of Aquinas’s philosophical thought, and thus not only shall I assume that God does exist and that there is also an objective moral order, but I shall actually assume everything that Aquinas himself assumes by the time he gets to his treatment of the virtue of religion in II-II.81–100, which is to say that I shall be presupposing the whole range of philosophical and even theological doctrines presented in the Ia and Ia-IIae. Thus, the question I am addressing is not whether for Aquinas the non-believer can have knowledge of moral truth, but rather whether the non-believer has access to a full life of natural virtue, given all that Aquinas holds about God and morality. Moreover, in answering negatively, in no way do I want to argue that for Aquinas the unbeliever is incapable of performing any morally good acts, or of finding any motivation for leading a morally good life; rather, I simply shall argue that the unbeliever is incapable of practicing the virtue of religion, which is a key virtue for the moral life, not only because it is the highest of the moral virtues, but because it is the one that governs all other moral virtues, and without it the natural life of the virtues loses its order and finality.

1. Religion as a Natural Virtue

In the Middle Ages it was disputed whether the theological virtues included the practice of other virtues, or were themselves part of other virtues. Thinkers such as Peter Lombard, Simon of Tournai, Alan of Lille, William of Auxerre, Philip the Chancellor, John of La Rochelle, the author of the Summa Fratris Alexandri, Odon Rigaud, and St. Bonaventure all categorized the virtue of religion, known to the pagan philosophers as that virtue whereby man gives to God the worship that is due to Him,⁴ as being somehow a theological virtue or at least as being directly related to the theological virtues.⁵ When Aquinas took up the topic, one of the first things he was expected to do was to decide how he was going to classify this virtue. In this regard he followed the steps of his immediate predecessor, Albert the Great,⁶ who in turn followed Cicero in classifying it,⁷ not as part of the theological virtues, but as part of the natural, moral virtue of justice. Aquinas thus establishes what will be his guiding definition of the virtue of religion throughout his discussion: “On the contrary, there is what Cicero says in the second [book] of De rhetorica inventione, that religion is that which offers worship and reverence to a superior nature, which they call divine.”⁸ More concretely, he classifies it as a “potential” part of the virtue of justice—that is, a virtue that is related to justice in that it gives someone (i.e., God) His due—but which falls short of being a species of justice by reason of its inability to return fully what is due to Him.⁹

Aquinas will defend this classification of religion as a moral virtue (as opposed to a theological virtue) by appealing to his doctrine on the end and object of the virtues. In Aquinas’s ethics, virtues are classified as theological and human depending on their object—that is, on that which they are concerned with. The theological virtues have God as their object, whereas the human, or natural virtues have creatures as their objects. For example, the object of the virtue of justice, a natural or human virtue, is that which is due to others, whereas the object of the theological virtue of faith is God Himself. With regard to religion, Aquinas says that God is not its object, but its end, and so it is not a theological virtue, but a moral one:

Religion is what offers to God due cultus.¹⁰ Therefore, two things are considered in religion. One is what religion offers, that is, cultus: and this is related to religion as matter and object. The other is that to which it is offered, that is, to God. To God cultus is shown not as if the acts whereby God is worshipped (colitur) attain God himself, as when we believe in God, by believing we attain God…. But rather due cultus is offered to God insofar as certain acts, whereby God is worshipped (colitur), are done for the sake of reverence of God, for example, the offering of sacrifices and other such things. Hence, it is manifest that God is not related to the virtue of religion as matter or object, but as end. Therefore, religion is not a theological virtue, whose object is the ultimate end: but rather it is a moral virtue, to which it belongs to be about the means pit., “those things that are for the end”].¹¹

Theological virtues are the highest virtues in Aquinas’s system because they directly have God as their object of operation, and because the virtue of religion has God as its end and not as its object, it cannot be a theological virtue.

Therefore, since for Aquinas religion is a natural virtue, and thus its acts are prescribed by the natural law,¹² it follows that the non-believer is at a moral disadvantage, for there will be religious acts prescribed by the natural law, such as cultic sacrifices,¹³ which the non-believer will be unable to practice.

Now, Aquinas asks whether its having God as end means that the virtue of religion is superior (praeferenda) to the other moral virtues, which have more worldly things as objects. He answers affirmatively:

Whatever is directed to an end takes its goodness from being ordered to that end; so that the nearer it is to the end the better it is. Now moral virtues, as stated above,¹⁴ are about matters that are ordered to God as their end. Now, religion approaches nearer to God than the other moral virtues, insofar as its actions are directly and immediately ordered to the honor of God. Hence, religion is higher (praeeminet) than the [other] moral virtues.¹⁵

Thus, since religion is the highest moral virtue, it follows that it is quite necessary for a full life of natural virtue. The non-believer is at a serious disadvantage in the moral life, not only because he is unable to partake of the supernatural, theological virtues, but even because he is unable to practice the highest of the natural, moral virtues.

Yet, as I hope to argue in the next section, it is not just this one virtue that the non-believer will be unable to practice, but the whole range of natural virtues in the manner and with the finality with which they are meant to be practiced. That is, the virtue of religion, as we shall see, has a governing or “commanding” role with respect to the other natural, moral virtues, and not practicing this virtue means that the entire life of natural virtue will remain aimless. To shed light on this reality in Aquinas’s thought, we must now turn to his doctrine on the commanded and elicited acts of a virtue, and specifically to the commanded and elicited acts of the virtue of religion.

2. Natural Sanctity

To understand this doctrine, it would be helpful to recall the distinction Aquinas makes in his Prima Secundae between the “elicited” and “commanded” acts of the will so as to apply it analogically to our present issue. On the one hand, the will has acts that are proper to it; Aquinas calls them the “elicited” acts of the will. The act of intention, which is the will’s desire of an end, is an example of an elicited act of the will. On the other hand, the will can command the acts that are proper to other powers, ordering them to the end; these are the “commanded” acts of the will. Thus, the act of walking is an act commanded by the will. Now, this distinction between elicited and commanded acts of the will has an analogical correlation in the treatise on the virtues and their acts: in effect, the elicited-commanded distinction is meant to apply to both virtues and powers. As Aquinas puts it: “By its command, the power or virtue that operates with regards to the end moves the power or virtue that effects those things that are ordered to that end.”¹⁶ This distinction is extremely important in Aquinas’s doctrine on the virtues, although curiously he cashes it out for the first time in the Summa theologiae in his discussion of almsgiving:

Nothing hinders an act that is proper to a virtue “elicitedly” from being attributed to another virtue as commanding it and directing it to its end. And in this way almsgiving is reckoned among works of satisfaction insofar as pity for the defect of a subject is ordered to the satisfaction of sin; and insofar as it is directed to placate God, it has the nature of a sacrifice, and thus it is commanded by latria.¹⁷

Thus, a virtue has, on the one hand, acts that are proper to it. Aquinas calls them the “elicited” acts of that virtue. Visiting one’s father, paying signs of respect to him, etc., are examples of the elicited acts of the virtue of piety. On the other hand, a virtue can “borrow,” as it were, the acts that are proper to other virtues, ordering them or commanding them to its own proper end and giving them a new formality. That is, the act of a virtue has its own natural end, but it can be ordered or commanded by a higher virtue to that virtue’s own end; these Aquinas calls the “commanded” acts of a virtue. In the example that Aquinas gives, an act of almsgiving, which is normally done for the sake of relieving the poor, can be elevated to an ulterior end, namely, that of placating God, by the virtue of satisfaction (which is a “part” of charity). Similarly, the virtue of piety can command an act of fortitude, for example, when a son joins the armed forces in order to honor his father. In this case, the act of obtaining an arduous good is the natural end of fortitude, but it is elevated by piety to the ulterior end of honoring the father.

Aquinas brings this teaching to the fore in his discussion on religion. He tackles the objection that:

It seems that religion does not order man to God alone. For it is said in James 1 [v. 27]: “Religion clean and undefiled before God and the Father is this, to visit orphans and widows in their tribulation, and to keep oneself immaculate from this world.” Now “to visit orphans and widows” is said according to an ordering to neighbor, and “to keep oneself unspotted from this world” pertains to an ordering of a man to himself. Therefore, religion is not said only as in an ordering to God.¹⁸

His reply is the central passage distinguishing between the elicited and commanded acts of religion:

Religion has two kinds of act: certain proper and immediate acts, which it elicits, through which man is ordered to God alone, such as sacrifice, adoration, and other suchlike things; and it has other acts which it produces by means of the virtues which it commands, ordering them to divine reverence. For, the virtue to which the end pertains commands the virtues to which those things that are ordered to the end pertain. And according to this “to visit orphans and widows in their tribulation,” which is an act elicited by [the virtue of] mercy, is put forward as an act of religion by way of command; and “to keep oneself clean from this world” as an act commanded by religion, but elicited by temperance or some other suchlike virtue.¹⁹

Thus, the principal acts of the virtue of religion are its elicited acts, such as adoration, prayer, and sacrifice. These are directly “elicited” by the virtue of religion because they have no other finality than to give honor to God. They are the acts that are proper to the virtue of religion. But since the virtue of religion can also “command” the acts of any other moral virtue to this divine end, it follows that there are also other secondary or indirect religious acts, such as chastity and martyrdom, which, though directly elicited by other moral virtues (e.g., temperance and fortitude) are “commanded” by the virtue of religion in such a way that religion orders them to a higher, religious end. Thus, the acts of essentially non-religious virtues can all be transformed into indirectly religious acts by being “commanded” to a religious end. In every act of religion, whether elicited or commanded by the virtue, the will is ordering something to the honor of God as to its end; otherwise, the act would not count as “religion” at all.

What is most noteworthy in this account for our purposes is the result that the virtue of religion has on the life of natural virtue in us. Religion does not just incline us to pray, offer sacrifice, etc., to God, but also to order our entire lives, all of our acts of virtue of whatever kind, to the honor of God as to our natural end. This is precisely why religion is a virtue in Aquinas’s account: it is a virtue because it “orders man to God.”²⁰ This order to God is the good that the virtue of religion obtains for us.

As stated above,²¹ “a virtue is that which makes its possessor good, and his act good likewise.” Hence we must say that every good act belongs to a virtue. Now it is evident that to render anyone his due has the aspect of good, since by rendering someone his due, one is also placed in a suitable relation to him as though “fittingly ordered to” him. Now, order comes under the aspect of good, just as mode and species, according to Augustine, in his book, De natura boni [3]. Since then it belongs to religion to pay due honor to someone, namely, to God, it is evident that religion is a virtue.²²

Therefore, given its “commanding” role, the virtue of religion has a certain generality, a kind of universal applicability in relation to the other moral virtues. This is why Aquinas identifies its role as one of the “general” virtues over and above its nature as a “special” virtue.²³ As a general virtue, religion takes on the name of “sanctity” (sanctitas) in Aquinas’s moral philosophy. That is, according to St. Thomas, insofar as this virtue elicits acts proper to itself, it is called ‘religion,’ but insofar as it commands the acts of the other virtues, ordering them to divine honor, it is called ‘sanctity’:

Thus, that through which the mind of man applies itself and its acts to God is called ‘sanctity.’ Hence, it does not differ from religion according to its essence, but only conceptually (ratione); for it is called ‘religion’ according as it shows to God due service in those things that pertain specifically to divine cultus, such as in sacrifices, oblations, and other suchlike things; but it is called ‘sanctity’ according as man refers to God not only these but also the works of the other virtues, or according as man disposes himself by means of good works to divine cultus.²⁴

And again:

Sanctity is a certain special virtue according; to its essence; and according to this, it is in a way the same as religion. It has a certain generality, however, insofar as by its command it directs the acts of all the virtues to the divine good, just as legal justice is said to be a general virtue, insofar as it directs the acts of all the virtues to the common good.²⁵

This goes to show that practically any act can count as an act of “sanctity” (that is, of religion as a “commanding” virtue) so long as it ordered to God as to an end. Not only can any virtuous act become an act of sanctity, but even otherwise morally-indifferent acts can be transformed into virtuous acts of sanctity. An entire life, in fact, if ordered to God as to an end, can be transformed into an act of the virtue of sanctity.²⁶ Therefore, in order to live a complete life of virtue, one needs not only to perform acts that are “elicited” by the virtue of religion, such as prayer and sacrifice; the truly virtuous man will in fact elevate the acts “elicited” by all other moral virtues, such as acts of temperance and fortitude, by ordering them to a religious end, thus transforming them into “commanded” acts of religion. Consequently, we can say that in Aquinas’s ethics the whole life of the virtuous man is in its most profound sense a life of worship, because it is governed or commanded by the natural virtue of religion, and as such this life receives the name of ‘sanctity.’

A theological point will perhaps shed light on the issue: there is a parallel between the theological virtue of charity and the natural virtue of religion. In the same way that religion can command the acts elicited by lower virtues, its own acts can themselves be commanded by higher virtues. That is to say, the theological virtues can command the acts elicited by religion and guide them to their own, proper ends:

By its command, the power or virtue that operates with regards to the end always moves the power or virtue that performs those things that are ordered to that end. Now, the theological virtues, namely, faith, hope and charity, have an act with regards to God as with regards to their proper object: and therefore, by their command they cause the act of religion, which performs certain things directed toward God: and therefore, Augustine says that “God is worshipped (colitur) by faith, hope and charity.”²⁷

Therefore, religion is to all the moral virtues what charity is to all the virtues without qualification. Charity is said to be the “form” of the virtues because it commands the acts of all those other virtues, ordering them to the ultimate supernatural end of loving God.²⁸ Without charity, therefore, the entire supernatural organism of virtues is lifeless, and loses its order, more or less like a corpse begins to decay because it has lost its substantial form.²⁹ Similarly, from what we have discussed it follows that for Aquinas the virtue of religion is, as it were, the “form” of the other moral virtues, for it orders them to God as to their natural end, and without this virtue the other virtues fall into disorder.

Conclusion

I have gleaned an argument from the texts of Aquinas to show that the moral life, even at a natural level, requires the practice of the virtue of religion, and hence belief in God. I have shown how for Aquinas the virtue of religion is a natural virtue annexed to justice and is actually the highest of the moral virtues, such that it “commands” all others towards its own, religious ends. Moreover, we saw that the virtue of religion is necessary in order to live a complete life of natural virtue, for this virtue elevates the acts “elicited” by all other moral virtues by ordering them to a religious end, thus transforming them into ‘commanded’ acts of religion. Thus, in Aquinas’s ethics, the whole life of the virtuous man is in its most profound sense a life of worship.

We can now easily see how according to Aquinas, lack of belief in God would have to affect a person’s moral life, even at the natural level. The unbeliever is unable to practice the virtue of religion, and this is morally detrimental for at least two reasons: (1) first, the virtue of religion is not only a legitimate virtue that perfects the person morally (and thus without it a person’s moral life cannot be complete), but is actually classified by Aquinas as the highest of the moral virtues, and thus neglect of this virtue is no small moral defect; and (2) most significantly, the virtue of religion has a commanding role in relation to the other moral virtues, such that it orders them to their natural end, and thus without this virtue the moral life falls into disorder. Therefore, in Aquinas, there is a profound sense in which morality must be grounded in God.