The Ethical Importance of the Beautiful: Wordsworth’s Revision of Hume’s Associationist Aesthetics in the 1805 Prelude

Recent scholars interested in Wordsworth’s relation to the empiricist tradition disagree on the extent to which his notion of the imagination resembles what Hume meant by “association.” This article examines this debate in the context of the earlier books of The Prelude (1805), as a way to explore how Wordsworth’s conception of the beautiful contained therein both exhibits fundamental characteristics of and diverges from Hume’s empiricism. I first argue that despite certain similarities, the mechanism of association fails to adequately explain Wordsworth’s imaginary activities. I then show how Wordsworth’s conception of the imagination enabled him to reconceive Hume’s empiricist aesthetics. I argue that while incorporating the language of empiricism, Wordsworth’s account of the beauty of nature also demonstrated its originality. Whereas Hume conceived of the aesthetic feeling of the beautiful as solely a passive response to the utility of natural objects, Wordsworth perceived it as an expression of love and respect for nature’s moral standing—an outlook that played a vital role in developing his moral sympathy.