Tragic Props and Cognitive Function: Aspects of the Function of Images in Thinking by Colleen Chaston (review)

“Cognitive science”—a term that encompasses theories of human brain processing from the fields of psychology, linguistics, philosophy, anthropology, and neuroscience—is still very new to the discipline of classics. Colleen Chaston’s book is one of the first to apply cognitive theory directly to Athenian tragedy. A lengthy introduction includes a brief account of Aristotle’s views on opsis, a subject that has been much discussed. Yet Aristotle’s theories on the visual are famously contradictory, informed by contemporary fourth-century theater practice that had changed greatly since the days of Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides.

Section 2 of the introduction is one of the most useful parts of the book, a taxonomy of the kind of images found in tragedy, which Chaston separates into two areas: visually perceived images—representations, optical images, semblances, and symbols—and mental images, described as emanating from mental pictures, descriptive passages, and figurative language.

In section 3 Chaston sets out at length the particular cognitive theory she has adopted, and then in the remainder of the book she applies it to three specific visual referents described as “props,” a term, however, that, as used by Chaston, needs clarification. There is no doubt about the significance of the minimal props used in Athenian tragedy. Most plays have one significant stage object that often functions as a catalyst to action, as if imbued with its own dramatic agency. Of the three examples discussed by Chaston—the shield devices in Aeschylus’ Seven Against Thebes, the funerary urn in Sophocles’ Electra, and the masks of Dionysus and Pentheus in Euripides’ Bacchae—only the urn can be strictly described as a stage property and was seen on stage as a three-dimensional object. Chaston, probably rightly, does not envision the seven shields of the Argives in Seven as appearing on stage, instead describing them as “imagery in thought” and “cognitive pegs.” As for the Bacchae, while the masks of Dionysus and Pentheus do indeed appear on stage, describing the mask as a prop negates the function of the dramatic mask as the very embodiment of the character being inhabited by the actor, and as a theatrical device capable of communicating distinct affective states.

What is intriguing about Chaston’s cognitive approach is that she applies equal processing mechanisms to these three very different visual metaphoric devices, namely the cognitive theories of Geir Kaufmann and Allan Paivio. These theories hold that, when tasks are familiar, problem solving is easier (called “reproductive” processing), but when novel problems are presented, different types of processing mechanisms are deployed simultaneously (known as “productive” processing). For Chaston, the visual system is more efficient at solving metaphorical problems, and “task novelty” determines that the simultaneous “productive” image system is deployed. Key for Chaston is that these associated images are recalled simultaneously and not sequentially as with verbal information.

In the case of the tragic mask, Chaston’s application of the cognitive theory of simultaneous image-processing would actually seem to support the notion that Greek tragic masks were capable of changing their perceived expressions in tandem with movement, music, and words. Chaston’s application of cognitive theory is certainly put to good use but, as with any foray into new interdisciplinary fields, there remain some areas of tension that the book might have addressed. First, Chaston assumes that modern cognitive theory can be directly applied to the ancient Athenian audience, but although modern humans share the same basic biological functions with ancient Greeks, we may not share the same cognitive processes.

Of course, the act of testing a hypothesis is all part and parcel of any scientific method, and this also holds true for those of us in the humanities who use the theories of the cognitive sciences in our work. This does not mean that the application of a certain theoretical framework has limited or no value just because conflicting theories...