All for the Regiment: The Army of the Ohio, 1861–1862 by Gerald J. Prokopowicz (review)

what was known about the lake and estimations about wh: it could he cl(me li) revive it. The public is largely missing here and almcist ct, mpletely reactive. The pc, pular press and elivircinmellt: l] activists receive t ilciry clear, readers mny be left wondering how the history ( 11 a 1: ike LY>uld bc st) dry. avid Stradling I jniver, ili· of (.' incinmati Ger: ild 1. Prcki, px,wicz. Al/1() T the Retument:The Army ( il the Ohi,j. i,Yc,/i ,Y' 62. Chapel Hill: University of Ntirth Carcilin.1 Press, 2007. 280 1, 11. ISBN: 080781626X ( cloth). S14· Vi Gerald j. Prcil«> powicz has achieved a miracle with All for the Regiment,he 11. 15 1118( le TWO 011, 41£1.1! c() ntrillittions to Civil Wai literature. The first ccintribution is in writing a sound, wellhal anced history (, f the Army of the Ohic),the first u) appear since the niiieleenlh centitry. Using an impressive range cil nianusci i pl and printed sources, theauthcir rec(}] lstrucls the histhelped 14) turn : 1 11(, lential Union disaster intc) a qualified vicuiry. Buell's men probably did ntit receive the credit they deserved here because Buell was less skillful than Ulysses S. Grant, the other : irmy ccimmander present, in handling the press. liziell's legimcnts ti, ught well nt Shil 1 the di,minance of defensive firepc>wer, primarily cmlic)died in the percussion rifle. The author's skepticism is legitimate. If defensive firepower necessarily rulll|, how did the German states inflict swift, decisive victories fin the French iii 1870? liroku,i, owicz sees . 1 key iii aim y strilctuic, which cmphasized small unit cohesion at the LY,mp: iny And regimental levels. Men were recruited lacally, elected their own ( ilficers, and ti, ok a fierce pride in their p: irochial unitS. This structure gave them cohesicin and staying fic,wer in battle. But the reverse side of the coin was that lt,yalty and 131·ide did Tic>t extend upward tothebrioide,ind divisic ) 11 leveis . Thesituation was worsened by Buell'slack tif charism: i as a ctimmander, his 1: ick of st: iff (, fficers to pull the : irmy 1(igether, : ind : 1 pt)(, 1 selection of subc)rilin: itc gcner: 11> i,tiflen chosen not fc)r military ability but for conservative politics deemed crucial to appeasing border state opinion. The upsh(} t w. is . in . 11117y with a stroiig body, but a weak 1, rain and nervt,us system. Regiments would ret: tin cohcsitin and light tin in perilous circumstances sci thait the army could ncil he destroyed. But, by the same t(iken, the parts (, 1 the irmy cciuld ni) t he wiclded into a larger striking ((, rce c:, pa 1,! c 1 inilicting . 1 mort. 11 blow. The ariny Cl,Ulci neither destrn. A question th: it needed tc) be asked is why the British Victori;in army, which heavily emphasized regimental layalty ,achieved a greater effectiveness M the comm:incl levi'IZ Nevertheless, this is a persuasive thesis and capalile < 11 extended application. Michael C. C. Adams Northern Kentucky University hit) Valley History 46 ...