The Invisible Revision of the Rush-Bagot Agreement, 1898–1914

ALVIN C. GLUEK TheInvisible Revision ofthe Rush-Bagot Agreement, 898-94 DURING THOSE CRUCIAL YEARS [¾Orll•898 to •9•4 within the North Atlantic Triangle,thehistoryof theRush-Bagot Agreementhasbeen almostignored.It is strangethat this is so, fbr the significance of Rush-Bagot- the primary arms limitation agreementfk)r North America- seems self-evident, especially during an agewhenGreat Britainwasstrategically withdrawing f¾om theWestern Hemisphere/ whenthehegmnony of the UnitedStateswasfhstbeingestablished, andwhenRush-Bagot was beinginf?ormally though invisibly revised to fit these fhcts. Perhaps because therevision tookthisunusualfbrm,mosthistorians haveignored it.Many'standard' histories oftheperiodpaylittleorno attention toRush~Bagot. It did notappearin theindexof Charles C. Tansill's Canadian~American Relations, •875 - •9•• (New Haven •943). (Neither didtheBoundary Waters Treaty.)It was ignoredbyBradford Perkins inhisGreat Rapprochement: England andtheUnited States, •895- •9•4 (NewYork •968). (So,tot),werethe North Pacificsealsl) Charles S.Campbell, Jr'sbook Ang'lo-American Understanding, •898- •9o3(Baltimore •957)didnotmentionthesubject. H.C. Allen'sGreatBritain and the United States: AHistory q/"Anglo-American Relatior•, •783- •952 (New York x955),spokeonlyof the originof the agreementand itstrials during the American Civil War. In an article, 'The Rush-Bagot Agreement,•8•7-•967 ' (NiagaraFrontier,x•v, summer •967), C.P. • Kenneth Bourne,The Balance ofPower inNorth America (Londonx967);S.F.Wells, 'British Strategic Withdrawal fromtheWestern Hemisphere, •904-• 9o6, ' Canadian Hi.•toricalReview, XLxx, 4,Dec.•968,335-56;andJohnGooch, 'GreatBritainandthe Defence ofCanada, x896-•9•4,'Journal ofImperial and Commonwealth H•tory,•I•,May •975,369-85 ß Canadian Historical Review, •.x,4, •979 ooo8-3755/79/• •oo-o466 $o•.•5/o ¸ University ofTorontoPress THE RUSH-BAGOT AGREEMENT 467 Stacey traced itshistory fromtheagreement's inception downtothe CivilWar-and then leapedinto the 292oswithoutreferenceto the intermediate years.An explanationfor thistransition wasfoundinhis recent work, Canada andthe Age ofConflict: AHi•tory ofCanadian Policies, •:s867 - •92s(Toronto •977),when hestated (2o5) that,during the slate-cleaning years,the'Rush-Bagot agreement...was notrevised ...' Andyet,if thescholar digsdeeperintothehistorical literature,he will findrewards. James M. Callahan's oldcut-and-paste history, The Neutrality oftheAmerican Lakes andAnglo-American Relations (Baltimore •898), reveals almost everything hewouldwanttoknow- andmoreabout the sub. ject from its genesis until the •89os.Not till almost three-quarters of a centurylater wasmuch elsewritten aboutthe subject. In •964jamesEayrs wroteasubstantial article, 'ArmsControl ontheGreatLakes' (Disarmament andArms' Control, n,4, •964,373-404) illumining thehistory of theagreement from x8•7 tothe'present.' Its quality, highbymost standards, suffers abitfromuni-archival research andpartisanship. The sources arealmost exclusively Canadian. The story of theagreementis(Abstract, 404) presented as'anunknown history of almostcontinuous violation... and ... of thehypocrisy of nations.' DonCourtneyPiper's The International Lawofthe Great Lakes: A Study ofCanadian-United States Co-operation (Durham,•c 2967),while more concerned withadministrative thanwithmilitaryhistory, writes dispassionately though somewhatsuperficially of alterations to the agreement in the •89osand thereafter.His conclusion (• • 2)isthat, since theagreement 'became technically obsolete withinafewdecades,' itsprovisions were'violated,especially by the UnitedStates.' But the violation was'not malicious but rathera unilateralinterpretation... to permitsomedesiredaction.'More recently,RichardA. Preston has touched uponthesubject of Rush-Bagot withinabroadstud 5,entitled The Defence ofan Unele. JF. nded Border: Planning for WarinNorth America •867-z939(Montreal1977).Histreatmentoftheagreement, however, is not analytical,methodical,or proi'bund.He overlooksmany significant eventsand confuses others.His ismilitaryhistorywritten without muchregardfordomestic and/ordiplomatic history. TheoriginalRush-Bagot Agreement wasan exchange of diplomatic notes (dated28and29April 2827)between theacting secretary ofstate andtheBritishministerat Washington. On behalfof theirgovernments , the two men promised virtuallyto disarmthe GreatLakes. WithinLakeOntario,eachcountrywasto haveonevessel nolarger thanonehundredtonsinburdenandcarrying nomorethanasingle eighteen-pound cannon. OntheUpperLakes, each was limited totwo 468 THE CANADIAN HISTORICAL REVIEW vessels similarly restricted: onChamplain, toasolitary ship ofthesame class. Allotherwarships weretobedismantled straightway. Aninformalarms limitation agreement, notatreaty, itcould berenounced by giving sixmonths' notice. History didnotallow theagreement toagegracefully. Several times duringthenineteenth century bothparties - though always acting separately - overstepped itsbounds. Fortunately, eachoccasion was short-lived andnotuntilthe •89oswastheagreement seriously questioned .Not till then wasit suggested that the physicalconditions surrounding theoriginal covenant nolongerexisted andthatstrategicaladvantages , initially balanced, nowseemed tofavor' GreatBritain. In 1817 there hadbeen nocanals linking thelakes totheseaboard; by the 189os therewereseveral systems. Whilethe UnitedStates had connected thelakesto the Hudson,Ohio, and Mississippi rivers,the depth ofthese canals was nogreater thanseven feet,thereby confining theirusetobarges. Bycontrast, theCanadian system (including WellandandtheStLawrence canals) hadbeendredgedto fourteenfeet, morethanenoughto floatgun-andtorpedo-boats. In a pinch,the British navy could dispatch small warships intothelakes. Practical arguments urgingchange in the Rush-Bagot Agreement camemainlyfrom...