Austria, Great Britain and the Crimean War: The Destruction of the European Concert by Paul W. Schroeder (review)

REVIEWS 217 and onlyfault, of thisintelligentbiography is the reluctance of the authorto amplifythefewbroadgeneralizations hedoes attempt. JAMES WINTER Universityo[ BritishColumbia Austria,GreatBritainandthe CrimeanWar: The Destruction o[ theEuropean Concert.•'AU•.w. SCaROEDER. Ithaca and London,Cornell UniversityPress, i972. Pp.xxiv,544,illus.$I9.5o. This is a monumental work, based on a vastassemblage of published and unpublished documents, the fruit of well-directed studies carriedout in no fewer than a dozen British and Continental libraries and archives. The book is well written; yet to pretendthat it makeseasyreadingwouldbe lessthan candidrichly documented monographs rarelydo. However,the patientreaderwill be amply rewardedfor his effort. Studyingunder Professor Schroeder's skilful guidancethe tangledweb of diplomaticmoveswhich preceded,accompanied, and followedthe CrimeanWar, hewill gainmanynovelinsights into theinner workings of nineteenth-century powerpoliticsand into the characterof all the chief actors on the international scene. AmongthelatterClarendon andRussell deservedly areblamedbytheauthor for their tacticsof confrontation and their astonishing lack of politicalconsistency ,whileCountBuol,Austria's muchmalignedforeignminister,receives a sympathetic if criticalappraisal. Though,asProfessor Schroeder putsit, 'Buol wasnot a fighterby nature,and onemight wishhe had stoodup to Western bullyingmoreoften' (p. 393), heshould notbeaccused of timidity.Frequently enoughhe refused to succumb to the threatsandblandishments of the Western powers. While at bottomin sympathy with the cause whichBritainandFrance espoused -the preservation of Turkey'sintegrity- he wasdetermined not to let his countrybe draggedinto a war whoseconsequences for Europe,but more especially for theHabsburg monarchy, couldnotbeforeseen. Austria,afterall, had not yet fully recovered from the domestic upheavals that had sorecently threatenedher very existence. Thus Buol'spolicyhad to be one of caution, predicated on considerations whichthe AustrianpoetGrillparzerhad summed up in a wryepigramwrittenin February1853 , at theveryoutset of theEastern crisis,when he remindedhis fellow-countrymen of 'the ancientrule that convalescents oughtto keepquiet.' (FranzGrillparzer,SiimtlicheWerke,ed.AugustSauer ,xii, 24I, no i3o9). Oncewar had brokenout Austria's bestassurance against becoming involved in the conflictwould,of course, havebeenan earlypeace.For thisreason, but alsobecause he wascommitted to 'theestablished practices andidealsof European Concertdiplomacy'(Preface,p. xii, footnote),Buol labouredunremittinglyto bringabouta negotiated settlement. Yet, paradoxically, thisverypolicy ,a policydictatedbyprudence and tradition,leditsauthorintowhat Professor Schroeder correctly describes asa 'desperate gamble'- a formal alliance with Britain and France. The move was intended to conciliate the Western 218 THE CANADIAN HISTORICAL REVIEW powers, and therebymakeit possible for Austriato retainsomecontrolover theirwar aims.Butthealliance andAustria's partialmobilization, whichprecededit , werealsomeantto frightenRussia into accepting Western peace terms - theFour Points - whichAustriahadearliersubmitted to her,butwhich shehadflatlyrejected. The treatyof alliancesigned on 2 December1854hassometimes beeninterpretedashavingenabled theHabsburg monarchy to extract special advantages from all sides. In pointof fact,however, thoughBuolhad the satisfaction of gettingpreliminary peacetalksstarted-he had at longlastobtained Russia's unconditional acceptance of the Four Points-his success wasonly a fleeting one: owing very largely to Britain'sintransigence the Vienna conference of March-Junei855 endedin failure. By the time the military situationand an Austrianultimatumhad brought Russia oncemoreto thepeacetable,andthe treatyof Paris(3ø March •856) had put an end to the war, a clear-sighted observer could no longerhave doubtedthat Buol'spolicyof close co-operation with BritainandFrancewasa fatal,thoughprobably unavoidable mistake. Whilepermanently alienating Russia ,that policyhad not gainedAustriathe friendship of the Westernpowers. Indeed, many of their leaders-men like Palmerston, Clarendon,Russell,and Napoleonni- harboured an undyinghatredof the Habsburg monarchy, and influentialsectors of Britishpublicopinionappearto haveshared theirfeelings. ThuswhileBuolhadmanaged, forthetimebeing, tospare hiscountry thecosts and risksof war, he had led it into.dangerous isolation;and within the next decadehistorywas to exacta high price from Austriafor her recentexercise in Concertdiplomacy. The foregoing abstractdoesscarce justiceto Professor Schroeder's work.This reviewerregrets moreparticularlythat limitations of space havenotpermitted him to discuss-and heartily endorse-the views on the proper methodsof diplomatichistorywhichthe authorhassoelegantly expounded in hisPreface. KARL F. HELLEINER Universityof Toronto ComparativeDevelopment in SocialWelfare.Editedby v..w.MARTIN. London, George Allen and Unwin [Toronto,Methuen],x97e.Pp. e47.$x5.95. This book is directed at 'social historians,social administrators,and social workers.'Unlessthe publishers are simplyseeking a widemarket,theymustbelievethat comparison and generalization at any levelyieldbothhistorical insightand policyperspectives. But a collection which dealswith threecenturies and two countries,touchingon the Act of Elizabeth,Speenhamland, Charles Beard's Whiggery, andmedicalinsurance in the 196os, isfrequently uninformative for students of historyand yet too disparate or detailedfor otherreaders. The essays are of unequalvalue.Two usefulpapersbasedon unpublished theses add to the evidence slowlybeingcollected aboutthe actualoperationof workhouses andSpeenhamland. Fromanexamination o.ftheeighteenth-century ...