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ß Rtutws CANADA LaConstruction navale royale • Qudbec • 739-• 759.JACQUES MATHIEU. Cahiersd'histoire no23.Quebec, LaSoci•t•historique deQuebec,•97•. Pp.xvi, • •o, illus.$3.5o. This bookis a welcomeadditionto a smallbut growingnumberof monographs concerningthe economicand administrativehistoryof New France. Professor Mathieu's studyof navalconstruction in New Francesheds lighton theimportant question of the roleof the stateasentrepreneurand asa stimulus to the colony's economic development.In fivebrief chaptersthe authorexaminesthe decisionto establish a navaldockyardatQuebec, theproblems associated withlocatingtheyard, thesupply of Canadian shipbuilding timber,thelabourforceemployed in theyard, andnavalconstruction in relationtotheeconomy. In eachcase hepresents interestingthoughsometimes questionable conclusions. Almostfrom hisarrival,theintendant,GillesHocquart,advocated establishment of a navaldockyard in Canada.In additionto pestering the ministerof marine,he encouraged thegrowthof ancillaryindustries, theexplorationof thecolony's fi)rest resources, andtheerectionof a breakwater(a prerequisite to large-scale shipbuilding ) in the StCharlesRiver.Accordingto Mathieu, Hocquart'senthusiasm and the detrimentaleffectof abadharvest in •737ontheeconomy combined withthethreat of warwithEnglandto persuade Maurepastoestablish a navaldockyardin Quebec. Unfortunately,the argumentisnotentirelyconvincing. Althoughthe purchaseat Louisbourgof New England-builtshipswent againstHocquart'smercantilistoutlook ,andiscitedasgroundsfor hisdesiretoencourage shipbuilding in NewFrance, there is no evidencethat shipsboughtat Louisbourgwere acquiredby Quebec merchants. Furthermore,a navaldockyardcouldnotmeetcolonialneeds.Asto the threat of war with England, there is no evidencethat the French demand for warships exceededthe capacity of navalyardsin France.Also,the real imperial defencerequirements of theFrenchnavylayin theWestIndieswherelongcruises 82 THE CANADIAN HISTORICAL REVIEW frequently wereineffective owingtotheabsence ofcareening andrefittingfacilities. Muchof theauthor's evidence suggests thatHocquartwasguiltyoffoliedegrandeur whenheviewedtheprojectednavaldockyardasa remedyfor theeconomic illsof New France,especially after welearnthatcareening andwinteringfacilities could notbeinstalledat Quebec.Also,oncethe yardwasin production,Hocquartgrew hostileto privateshipbuilding, and asearlyas •735 he had reliablereportsthat Canadiantimberwasunsuitable for ships withkeel-lengths of over •oofeet.Nine of twelveshipsbuilt for the navy had keel lengthsof over I •5 feet. Yet Mathieu dismisses Hocquart's curiousrolewithanexcuse; bothheandMaurepaswerefaced witha newsituationinvolvingunknown,unexploitedforestresources. Mathieu's treatmentof thelocation anderectionof thedockyard raises asmany questions asitanswers. Onewouldliketoknowmoreaboutthereasons forconstantly expandingtheshipbuilding facilities. Whatwastherationalefor constructing naval vessels of different sizes,and who profited from the half million livrespaid in propertytransfersand for workdoneon theyard?Elsewhere,the treatmentof the labourforcein the dockyardindicates thatjealousyarosebetweenCanadianand Frenchworkmenoverwagedifferentials, andasteady supply of labourfromFrance wasrequiredasCanadiansgraduallydrifted awayduring the •74os.Yet Mathieu concludes thatdespiteallthisthedockyardassisted theeconomy. Beyondpouring •,ooo,ooo livresintoNewFranceanddestroying theprivateshipbuilding industry,it isdifficulttoseehow.Mathieushows thattimbersuppliers werenobodies whobarely madea profit,if atall.To whomwereallthesefundspaid? Nevertheless, one mustemphasize that thisstudyis an importantcontribution because it raises questions andpointstoareaswherefurther answers totheproblem of the Frenchgovernment's rolein Canada'seconomic developmentmaybefound. Mathieu's treatmentof thetimbersupplyproblemisthemostsatisfactory partof the book.It isalsomostrevealing,and containsthe keyto the author'sexplanation{br the failure of navalshipbuilding.He arguesconvincingly that Canadiantimberwas unsuitablefor large ships,and that despitethe government'sgoodintentionsthis spelledthe defeatof the industry.All the more reason,however,to questionHocquart 'ssupportof the project.In addition,navalshipbuilding contributedto overproduction intheancillary industries. The authorhaspointedtotheprincipalcause of failureof navalshipbuilding. He shouldbeencouraged toinvestigate whetherthe industryhelpedcolonists tooffsettheworsteffects oftheeconomic crisis ofthe 174os or if it exacerbated them. JAMES PRITCHARD Queen's Unive•:4ty ArcticBreakthough: Franklin's Expeditions, •r8•9-•847. PAUL NANTON. Toronto, Vancouver ,Clarke,Irwin, •97o-Pp.xiv,•6•, maps.$6.5o. TheSearchJbr Franklin.LESLIE H. NEATLY. Edmonton,Hutrig, •97o. Pp. •8 I, maps. $7.05. Campbell qlc theYukon.CLIFFORD WILSON. Toronto, Macmillan, •97o. Pp. xxvi, •89, illus.$8.95 Ethnohisto•y in Southwestern Alaska andtheSouthern Yukon: Method andContent. Edited ...

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