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REVIEWS $11 many 'agendafor research,' so many listsof 'unanswered questions.' Surely, aftertwentyyearsin economic history, Hartwellmighthaveproceeded to try to dealwith someof the puzzles he hasdetected. Yet hiscomments, and his distribution of emphasis, are sooftenstimulating that oneforgives him in the end.I wasespecially impressed byhisdiscussion of theroleof common law in Englishindustrialisation. In treating educationand services he is rather less successful. He sensibly tellsus to think aboutthe importanceof educational development in eighteenth-century England.But he doesnot provideuswith anyusefulmethodology for pursuing the topic.And in hisessay on the 'service sector' he simplyliststhe several components of thisheterogeneous grouping and tells us how little we know about them. Repetition reduces thevalueof thebook.If Hartwellhad takenthe trouble to purgehisessays, he couldhavereduced bothbulkandpriceby at leastonequarter .It is a pity he did not do so.The readeris annoyed to find the same arguments, the samewords,and the samereferences recurringin chapterafter chapter.Inevitably,onebegins to skip.But in sodoingonecanmisstheflashes of insightand goodsense whichmake the bookworthwhile.Hence no one shouldtry to read the bookthrough.It shouldbe sampledas a guideto the literatureand asa checkto one'sownlessdisciplined and lesscoherent broodhags . On these scores it isfirstrate. IAN M. DRUMMOND Universityof Toronto China's Nation-Building Effort, •927-•937: The Financial and Economic Record.ARTHUR YOUNG. Stanford, HooverInstitutionPress, StanfordUniversity, I97•. Pp.xx,553.$•9.5øThe financialand economic Chinainheritedby ChiangKai-shekin •9• 7 may in many wayshave beenbetterthan Chiang'slegacyto the Communists in •949, although the disorderwas comparable.Mr. Young's book, however, covers onlythe sanguine periodof •9•7-37, concentrating on publicfinance, money,and economic development. The authorwasChiang's financialadviser from I9•9 to •947 and hencewriteswith full knowledge and authority.His command of the statistical information alone makes this book a valuable reference.But like the other economists of his vintage,Mr Young tendsto regardsocial andpoliticalchanges whichhadobviously andcontinually decisive influence on Chinese economy andfinanceasparameters ratherthan variables. Mr Young correctlyobserves: 'In a country's modernization and development , the chieffactormustbe the effortof the leaders and its people.But progress can be much greaterwith the wiseuseof foreignpersonnel, the technology they bring,and externalresources.' He alsoconcludes: 'In summary ,China'snation-building effortin theprewardecade shows what canbe doneprimarilybynational initiative,aidedbyforeign personnel anda moderate amount of externalresources.' By 'nationalinitiative,' one may surmise,Mr Young means'the effort of the leadersand the people.'The peopleunder 312 THE CANADIAN HISTORICAL REVIEW ChiangKai-shekwere neithermobilizednor organized, certainlynot led, in economic efforts. The manyagrarianreformprojects fromabove wereall dead letters.That waswhy socialpolicies wereinadequate and the rural situation was acute.As to the leadership, apart from the oft praisedpersonality of Chiang,onefindsamong Mr Young's pages thebitterdissension between Chiang and oneof hisbrothers-in-law, T.V. Soong, an ablefinancieraccording to our author. He was succeeded by H.H. Kung, anotherbrother-in-lawof Chiang Kai-shek.In the faceof a mountingsilvercrisis in •934 and •935, Kung could rejectevenforeignadvice to makea formalrepresentation of China's viewson thismatterto Washington. The matter,to saytheleast,hadthegravest impact on the livesof millionsof Chinesepeople.But Kung 'held back because of wantingto avoid any intrusionin Americanpoliticsand to avoid risk of offending the Americangovernment.' This man,in the eyes of the representative of the Bankof Englandin China, Cyril Rogers, had the mentalityof a childof twelve.'If I,' Rogerssaid,'wereto recordhis [Kung's]conversations with me aboutbankingand play it back,nobodywould ever take Chiang's government seriously again.' The leadershipquality shouldbe no surpriseto Mr Young's readers. Throughoutthe period under consideration, the mostimportantsourceof revenue of Chiang's government had beenthe maritimecustoms. It stoodat 59.8per centof the totalrevenue in •932 and at 33.3per centin •936-in bothcases it beingthe largestsingle item.Evidentlythe government financially depended on foreigntrade and this dependence couldhardly fail to affect Chiang'sforeignpolicyas it had previously doneLi Hung-chang's in the nineteenth century. The onlydifference wasthatwhereas Li Hung-chang was nonationalist (hewasborntooearlyforthat), Chiangclaimed tobetheleader of China's nationalism. In the peak of the prewarprosperity, Chiang'sgovernment spenton the averageone-eighth of its total expenditure on educationand culture,reconstruction , and capitalinvestment for government banksandenterprises. At the sametime,militaryexpenses and debtservices nearlyswallowed up the restof the budget.With these figures in mind,howcanoneconclude that 'Chiang realizedthe importance of reconstruction and saidthat the anti-Communist effortshouldbe 7ø per centpoliticaland 3ø per centmilitary.'His inadequate socialand economic policies madesurethat his anti-Communist effortwas...


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