The Bonus March: An Episode of the Great Depression by Roger Daniels (review)

216 THE CANADIAN HISTORICAL REVIEW littleinterpretation. Thisfaultiscompounded byanunfortunate limitednumber of cases whichfrequentlycauses him to deriveconclusions from statistics with a baseassmallastwentyor thirty or evenfewer- conclusions whichcan only beregardedasstatistically unreliable. Knightsstated at theoutset of hisbookthathispurpose wasto providedata for the useof otherresearchers. Thereisno doubtof the usefulness of hisgross findingsconcerning the rate of residential mobilityin and throughBoston, provided theyareinterpreted asI outlinedabove(thedatabase in thisinstance is adequatesinceit wasnot dividedtoo many ways); I alsorecommend his appendices on 'Usingcitydirectories in ante-bellum urbanhistorical research,' 'A methodfor checking the accuracy of some manuscript census data,'and 'An estimate of census underenumeration.' But asa workin itsownright,The Plain Peopleof Bostonfails to revealas much concerning the plain peopleas the readerisledto expectandis,overall,seriously flawed. RONALD LAWSON HunterCollege, CUN¾, andBureauo[AppliedSocialResearch, ColumbiaUniversity The Bonus March: An Episodeo[ the GreatDepression. ROO•,R DAN•,LS. Westport ,Conn.,Greenwood Publishing, •97•. PP.xiv, 37o,illus.$I4.oo. Thisbookhasthreebroadfocalpoints:compensation for veterans asa political issue fromWorldWar xto themid-thirties; theanatomy of themajorveterans' marchonWashington in thesummer of •93•; andtheshifting roleassigned the BonusMarch in the ideological debates of the New Deal and Cold War. The bookisnotintegrated byanyoverarching thesis or conceptualization, but much of thedisparate detailisintrinsically interesting, andno othersource provides sothorough a discussion of theBonus March tragedy. AlthoughtheWilsonadministration purposely introduced government allotmentsfor dependents and voluntaryinsurance for servicemen duringWorld War • in hopes of avoiding a repetition of thepension fightsof the post-Civil War years, thedrivefora veterans bonus beganevenbeforeJohnnycamemarching home.Everyadministration from Harding to Roosevelt opposed adjusted service compensation (the bonus),but Congress twiceover-rode presidential vetoson the subject.A Coolidgedefeatin •9•4 established low interestloan privileges forveterans oncertificates maturing withaccumulated interest twenty years later;andaRoosevelt defeat in •936immediately putmoney intothehands of overthreemillioncitizens. With characteristic politicalmagicFDR retained veteransupport evenwhilehisEconomy Act of •933 cut existing payments to levels below those oftheHoover administration. The authorpresents thepolitics ofthebonus withinthatprogressive dichotomy ofthepeoplev theinterests, with WrightPatman(D Tex.), whoopened hisprivatepapers totheauthor, emerging in the thirtiesasthe heroof the pro-bonus forces.The author'sown evidence hints atsome ofthevariations andcomplications, however. In •93•, forexample, George Norris,FiorelloLaGuardia,andRobertLaFollette, Jr, progressives all, REVIEWS 217 opposed bonus legislation; whilecorporate liberalOwenD. Youngof General Electric advocated a bigincrease in theloanprovisions of bonus certificates. If WrightPatman istheheroofthepolitics of thebonus, thenPelhamGlassford ,patrician,retiredbrigadiergeneral,World War x veteran,and chiefof theWashington policeforce, istheheroof theBonus March.He aloneamonga hostof city,federal,andmilitaryofficials seemed ableto understand and work withtheBonus Expeditionary Force.He hadthecapacity to keepa coolhead in themidstofirrationalfearsaboutCommunist infiltration,mountingvagrancy, and insurrectionary violence. Chiefof Staff GeneralDouglasMacArthur and Secretary ofWar Patrick Hurley,in contrast, seemed eager forconflict andconfrontation .The author conclusively shows that MacArthur ignoredHoover's instructions on e8July•93•. Insteadof co-operating with Glassford's police,he usurped them;instead ofsurrounding onlytheareawhereveterans hadsquatted in downtown Washington, hecleared theentireDistrict.Evenmoresignificant, there isevidence tosuggest thatMacArthur ignored Hoover's explicit orders not to taketroops across thePotomac to theAnacostia Camp.At midnightof the •8th, however, thegeneral pressed on,with teargasand bayonets, andin so doingeasta lasting shadow of inhumanity andruthlessness across theHoover administration. ButHooveronlyadded tohisproblems, forinstead ofsacking his insubordinate chiefof staffhefabricated selfrighteous andmisleading explanations of his behaviour. Thetragedy at Anacostia seems tohavehadnoapparent effect onthepolitics of the bonus, despite the author'sassertions to the contrary.Patmanurged veterans to stayat homein future,andNew Dealers cutexisting benefits. Nor didtheCongressional reversal of Roosevelt's •936vetoturnontheepisode. The important consequences of theBonus March,asthe authorshows in hislast chapter, areto befoundin therealmof symbol andmyth.What Professor Danielsthusloses bya gapbetween thefirstand second panels of histriptych hegains in thethird,wherehechronicles thecontinuing fightovertheBonus Marchhistory byideological partisans in thefollowing decades. ROBERT CUFF YorkUniversity LaborOrganizations in theUnitedStates andMexico:A Historyo[ theirRelations .x•,avE¾ t,. LEWNSTZ•N. Westport,Conn.,Greenwood Publishing, I97•. Pp.x, •58. $•x.oo. This bookdeserves a wider audience than its prosaictitle is likely to attract. Though theexpansion of business enterprise beyond America's borders iswell documented, few researchers havedevotedattentionto similardevelopments among American tradeunions. Levenstein recounts theepisodic forces which ledtrade-unionleaders in theUnited Statesto reachacross theborder.Throughouttheyears fromGompers to Meany,muchmorethana friendly handshake hasbeen sought. At firsttheauthor catalogues Gompers' motives withoutassigningapriority , noting thatthet,r•.leader saw anopportunity towieldinfluence ...