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•u•vmws 175 when"wehadreached theendof ourmanpower resources" andneededRussia's helpagainst Japan. Russia's insistence upona social revolution in eastern Europe wasdueto her security needs. All that hashappened sincehasbeensimilarly motivated b her memories of unprovoked aggression The chance of postwar y ß co-operation waslostby Roosevelt's deathandthe inexperience of Trumanwho allowed himself to follow the anti-Communist tendencies of Americans like Leahy., Thetensions which underlie theCold Wararose from thebelief inthe West'that Russia wasoutto conquer the worldbecause of Russian-Communist control of EastEurope. Viceversa it wasthe Western opposition to the Soviet organization of Eastern Europewhichconvinced the Redleaders thatthe West wasasfundamentally hostile asever.Thenthe prolonged talk in the West of freeingEast Europefrom Sovietdomination led the Russians to arm and to conduct a world-wideideological struggleagainstthe West, quite apart from anyprevious desire theymayhavehadtodoso." It will be evident fromthese partialstatements thatProfessor Fieming's chief targetisthe coterie of American conservatives whohaverefused to acceptthe Russian Revolution of 1917iustasthe Frenchrightists refusedto acceptthe Revolution of 1789.Sir WinstonChurchillis alsoheldresponsible. His speech at Fulton,Missouri, "preconditioned manymillions of listeners for a developing world crusadeto smashworld communismin the name of Anglo-Saxon democracy." The sinister effects of the Trumanand Eisenhower doctrines, the McCarthy, hysteria, thefailure torecognize thePeople's Republic ofChina, and theDullespolicy ofmassive retaliation arealso spelled outinfull. In all,these twolargevolumes present the ease against America andmaydo something to alleviate theviewthatRussia wasto blameforall theevents of the Cold War. A useful corrective?Hardly, since the kind of students of contemporary history who willread these •ages would beunlikely toaccept such one-sided descriptions of contemporary history. ButProfessor Fleming hasat the very leastadopteda courageous attitudeof defianceagainstprevailing political opinions. JoI• S.CornrAy University ofBritish Columbia The Conspirators: A Studyo• the Coupd'Etat.By D. J. GooDs•,•,•,D. Toronto: The MacmillanCompany of CanadaLimited.1962.Pp. xii, 252, illus.$5.00. MAJOR GOODSPEED'$ study ofthecoupd'4tatexplores a borderline wherepolitical andmilitaryhistory meet.Sixcases havebeenselected for study:the Serbian coupof 1908 whichoverthrew the Obrenovieh d asty,the Dublin risingof 1916,the Bolshevik Revolution, theKappPutsch of 1920,Mussolini's marchon Rome,and the bombplot againstHitler in 1944. Althoughthe elementof melodrama in theseevents is exploited and onlysecondary sources used,the analysis isimpressive. Eachcoupis skilfully placed in itspolitical setting. The Serbian conspirators, whose ruthlessness wouldhavedonecreditto.theJanissaries, inherited a tradition of palace revolution. Wherenosuchtradition existed, asin the Germanoffleers' coupof 1944,theconspirators suffered fromconscience andhesitation. The Irish leaders who attempted the impossible appearas heirsto the futile heroics of Robert Emmett and the earlier Fenians. The author's interpretation of the relations betweenthe politicalleadersof thecoups andtheiractivists isilluminating. It ispointed outthatLenin's political 176 Tm• CANADIAN IIISTORICAL REVIEW strategy wasjeopardized b thetactical incompetence of hisactivists Mussolini's y ß activists areshown tohavebeeninsubordinate, butout-man•euwed by theDuee. In the caseof theKappPutsch, all important decisions weretakenby military activists oftenwithoutconsulting theirciviliancolleagues, whilein Irelandall leaders ofconsequence wereactivists. In introducing the Russian revolution, the authorpresents a sombre picture of im erialRussia whichneedsqualification He alsoneglects to examine the p ß character of the Petrograd garrison. Its ratioof offleers to menwasincredibly low and its ranksfilledwith recentconscripts drawnfrom olderage groups. Moreover, hissuggestion thattheProvisional Covernment couldhavebeensaved by making peaceignores notonl Kerensky's commitments to the Alliedcause, Y but thepriceLeninpaid at Brest-Litovsk andthe subsequent civilwar carried on largel by to-All Russians Theseblemishes, however,do not weaken Y P Y ß MajorGoodspeed's account of the tacticalaspects of the Bolshevik seizure of power. Theauthor leaves theimpression thatthecoupd'dtatis a desperate expedient whichlowers thetoneof political life andestablishes dangerous precedents. He concludes that conspiracies earmot overthrow vigilantpractising democracies. It mightbeadded thattheyareequally ineffective against anyvigorous government with reliable armed forces. H. SEN•O}t University ofToronto TotalWar and ColdWar: Problems in CivilianControlo[ the Military.Edited by Ha•}t¾L. Co•.•.s. Columbus: OhioStateUniversity Press. 1962.Pp. xii, $00. $7.00. IN mmENT •r•.,•}tS American presses havebeenpouring outsuch a floodof books onthe ColdWar andits militaryproblems that,by the law of averages, only comparatively few of themcanbe good.Quitesimply,thereare,in .thisfield, far moretitlesthantherearepolished writers whoh/ryesomething worthwhile to say.It is, therefore, with someapprehension that onepicksup a bookwith sounpromising a title asTotalWar and ColdWar. Even.theinformation that the essas in the bookhavebeencompiled underthe editorship of Harry L y ß Coles, whocontributed totheexcellent seven-volume history oftheUnitedStates ArmyAir Forcein theSecond WorldWar, is notquitesufficient to wardoff a slight premonitory chill. Thismakes...


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