Biophilia and Emotive Ethics: Derrida, Alice, and Animals

In view of recent research can we continue to argue for a superiority over other animals that justifies dominating and exploiting them? This question, now “in the center of ethical discussion,” invites us to “radically reconsider the terms of ethical inquiry” (Rolston 1993, 382). Those terms now include the feelings biophilia and biophobia as well as compassion, sympathy, and empathy. Are we prepared to value not only reason but also emotions that connect us to other animals? If we are to save ourselves and our planet, we need a more interdisciplinary model of ethics that includes “emotive” as well as analytic ethics. Derrida’s “L’Animal que donc je suis (ti suivre)” (1997) combines them, citing literature to demonstrate the role of feelings in situation-specific ethics. Though he does not use E.O Wilson’s terminology, Derrida suggests that what blocks biophilia is an apparently instinctive, superstitious fear of animals that has expanded into what we now call biophobia. Ultimately, Derrida focuses on a new experience of compassion that can bring about the political change needed to save our planet.