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  • For King and Kanata: Canadian Indians and the First World Warby Timothy C. Winegard
  • Michael D. Stevenson
Timothy C. Winegard. For King and Kanata: Canadian Indians and the First World War. Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 2012. 224pp. Notes. Illustrations. Bibliography. Index. $24.95 sc.

For King and Kanataprovides an excellent overview of the mobilization of Native Canadians during World War I. Timothy Winegard emphasizes three themes in his attempt to expand the analysis of the contributions and experiences of more than 4,000 Indian soldiers beyond the traditional ‘forgotten warrior’ genre to encompass the national and international forces shaping their incorporation into Canada’s military. For Winegard, the calculated mobilization of Aboriginals was a continuation of the pragmatic tradition to use Indian recruits when it suited the interests of the British and Canadian governments. Additionally, racial notions either stressing Aboriginal martial prowess or denigrating the cultural and intellectual capacity of Native soldiers shaped the contemporary attitudes of non-Native military and civilian administrators. In either case, these officials viewed military service as a tool for [End Page 138]assimilation. Finally, the unprecedented levels of Aboriginal participation in the Great War were a potential catalyst for Native attainment of equal rights, but this hope proved illusory, and decades would pass before significant progress towards political, economic, and social justice was made.

Winegard divides his book into four parts. In the first, he discusses the post-Confederation marginalization of Canada’s Aboriginal population, the racialized image of the ‘noble savage’, and the lack of a well-defined government enlistment policy that denied Natives the opportunity to fight in the Boer War while not formally exempting them from military service under the terms of the 1904 Militia Act. The second and most detailed section of For King and Kanataexamines Indian enlistment patterns and government mobilization policy from 1914 to 1918. Unsure of the legal status of Natives, Department of Indian Affairs officials initially discouraged Aboriginal enlistment despite widespread Native support for the war. But direct appeals issued by the Colonial Office in October and December 1915 urging indigenous populations in British Dominions to enlist caused Canadian officials to formally encourage Indian mobilization, a policy change that stimulated a dramatic increase in Aboriginal recruits. The contentious conscription debate in 1917 and 1918 impacted Native mobilization policy, and the Borden government eventually exempted Indians from compulsory military service due to registration difficulties and the interpretation of Aboriginal treaties with the British Crown. The third section of the book analyzes the important contributions of Indian soldiers on the Western Front, emphasizing the distinguished record of Native snipers and scouts, the cultural barriers facing Aboriginal combatants, and the significant casualties suffered by Native troops. Finally, Winegard examines the economic contribution of Natives to the war effort and the long-term impact of the war. Government policy expropriating Aboriginal territory during the war was compounded by the disbursement of Native lands to returning white veterans, and it would not be until 1936 that Indian veterans would be accorded full pension rights. Despite these problems, Aboriginal participation in the war spurred the creation of national organizations lobbying for greater Native rights.

For King and Kanataprovides an excellent, well-written, and well-organized overview of Canadian Aboriginal participation in the First World War. Winegard has thoroughly researched a comprehensive volume of Canadian records to document the shifting administrative policies affecting Indian enlistment, and he provides an extensive array of biographical profiles to effectively convey the opinions and actions of Native and non-Native participants in the mobilization process. Despite these considerable strengths, one of the book’s primary arguments that Aboriginal recruitment strategies were in the minds of senior Allied policy makers throughout the war is largely unsubstantiated. Winegard trumpets his use of British Colonial Office and [End Page 139]War Office records held in the United Kingdom National Archives that will allow him to transcend the “blinding national affiliations” (xi) of historians previously analyzing Aboriginal mobilization in Canada. It is rather surprising, therefore, that not a single citation to a record contained in Colonial Office and War Office collections can be found in nearly 600 endnotes. Much emphasis is placed on...

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