Регионы России. Хроника и руководители. Том 7: Республика Татарстан, Удмуртская республика, Республика Мордовия Ред. по К. Мацузато, Том 8: Республика Марий Эл, Чувашская республика, Республика Башкортостан Ред. по К. Мацузато (review)

571 Ab Imperio, 1/2004 проводящих полевые наблюдения, опирается на результаты соб- ственных многолетних скрупулез- ных исследований на местах, что дает ему возможность прибегнуть к подобной экстраполяции. Пятая глава, “Биографии руководителей области”, и шестая, “Движение руководящего состава субреги- онального уровня”, содержат краткие сведения об отдельных областных и районных руководи- телях, а также отображают почти двадцатилетнюю политическую судьбу городов и районов Харь- ковщины. Общий вывод, который мож- но сделать, знакомясь со сбор- ником, – перед нами, с одной стороны, своего рода хронико- аналитический срез внутрипо- литической и административной жизни последних лет отдельной области – Харьковской, относи- мой к самым крупным в Украине; с другой – набор промежуточных верифицированных данных для дальнейших построений, касаю- щихся не только конкретного го- сударства, но и ряда сопредельных стран. Есть и еще один важный момент, который скорее угады- вается в проекте – серьезный политический, экономический и культурный интерес японского общества к славянству и славя- но-евразийскому пространству, пограничному Японии. Таким об- разом, взгляд на Украину изнутри, в данном случае с помощью непо- средственного анализа политиче- ских процессов, происходящих в Харьковской области, обращается в своего рода макроуровневый проект не только межгосудар- ственного, но и межконтинен- тального евроазиатского плана, в котором России, естественно, отводится центральное место. Dmitry P. GORENBURG Регионы России. Хроника и руководители. Том 7: Респу- блика Татарстан, Удмуртская республика, Республика Мордо- вия / Ред. К. Мацузато. Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University, 2000. 471 с.; Том 8: Республика Марий Эл, Чуваш- ская республика, Республика Башкортостан / Ред. К. Мацузато. Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University, 2003. 342 с. In the two volumes under review here, Dr. Matsuzato and his collaborators continue their efforts to document and explain the power dynamics in the former Soviet Union at the local and regional level. Together , these two volumes describe these processes in all six ethnic 572 Рецензии/Reviews republics of the Volga and Urals regions, with volume 7 covering Tatarstan, Udmurtia, and Mordovia, while volume 8 examines Bashkortostan , Chuvashia, and Mari El. Each of the regional chapters, written or co-written by a local social scientist, has a similar structure, starting with an overview of the region, then a chronology of political events from 1988 to the date of writing (which ranges from 1998 for Tatarstan and Mordovia to 2002 for Bashkortostan ), and concluding with a set of short biographies of the region’s political elite. Several of the chapters are accompanied by diagrams that show the changes in the composition of the local elite over time. Finally, each of the volumes includes an introduction by Dr. Matsuzato, which sets out the comparative framework for the whole enterprise and draws comparisons among the regions. In this review, I first describe Matsuzato ’s general model of regional power consolidation and then turn to a discussion of each of the regional chapters. The Matsuzato model of local power consolidation is quite simple. The most important proposition is that authoritarianism develops in regions where governors (called presidents) have the power to appoint raion-level administrators. In the six regions discussed in these two volumes, this outcome has occurred in Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and Mordovia. Efforts by the republic leadership to end the election of local leaders failed in Udmurtia and Mari El and were not attempted in Chuvashia. Furthermore, in Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, the appointed local bosses are required to run for seats in the republic parliament . This system, which Matsuzato calls centralized caciquism, in effect merges the executive and legislative branches of government and allows the governor to control all levers of power in the republic. At the same time, the extent of elite consolidation varies even in the authoritarian regions. In Matsuzato’s model, consolidation depends on the extent of internal divisions within the region. Such divisions can be caused by clan or ethnic divisions within the regions. If the authoritarian elite is not consolidated (as in Bashkortostan and Mordovia), the government tries to maintain control by repressing the press, gerrymandering electoral districts, and preventing opposition candidates from registering for elections. If it is consolidated (Tatarstan), the rulers feel secure enough to allow more open discussion in the media and even some public opposition, so we see fewer violations of human rights. The weaker republics featured frequent turnover of government and occasional (and sometimes successful ) attempts to eliminate the office of the president and restore 573 Ab Imperio, 1/2004 parliamentary rule. In their weakness , their efforts to catch up to Tatarstan led to sporadic attempts at repression, which were foiled in Mari El and Udmurtia but succeeded in Mordovia. Only Chuvashia has had a succession of relatively liberal regimes throughout the 1990s. In five of the six republics there was a period of political instability in the early 1990s, as the disintegration of the Communist political system led to a search for new formulas for stable government. Only Tatarstan avoided such instability, primarily because its leaders instituted a republic presidency early on as part of their competition for power with Boris Yeltsin’s Russian government. Relations with Moscow play a notably minor role in the consolidation of local authority. UnderYelstin, Moscow had an impact on local politics only if it had local allies with some independent source of power and influence. Moscow has also been able to arbitrate whenever local political conflicts threatened to get out of control, as they did in Mari El in 1996 and Udmurtia in 1998. While Putin has frequently spoken of the need to strengthen central control of the regions, he has only succeeded in imposing such control on the weaker regions, as exemplified by the continuing and seemingly never-ending battle...