The Social, Environmental, and Personal Costs of Cold War Competition

Scientific and technological competition between the superpowers was a defining characteristic of the Cold War. That competition was spurred by the quest for supremacy in the production and refinement of nuclear weapons and the delivery systems that sent them racing to their targets. Both had a “peaceful” face: nuclear power drew on many of the resources used for nuclear weapons; rockets that lofted payloads into outer space shared a pedigree with ballistic missiles. These four books are all situated within this terrain, and alert us to sometimes disastrous personal, social, and environmental consequences of the pursuit of scientific and technological competition at any cost.

Yanek Mieczkowski is a man with a mission. That mission is to correct the negative image of Dwight D. Eisenhower as a president who failed to assert himself, notably after the launch of two earth-orbiting satellites by the Soviet Union in fall 1957. Through an analysis of political and media responses to Sputnik, Mieczkowski argues that the Sputnik moment serves as a unique window into several defining characteristics of Eisenhower’s presidential legacy: his enduring principles, his deep suspicion of federal spending, and his measured approach to leadership. In concentrating on this moment in history, Mieczkowski also argues for a reinterpretation of the U.S.–Soviet space race that restores credit to Eisenhower’s oft-forgotten achievements and contributions to American pre-eminence.

To resuscitate Ike’s image as Cold War commander-in-chief, Mieczkowski explains that his book “addresses the perception and reality of Eisenhower’s leadership within three critical frameworks.” First is Sputnik’s testing of Ike’s leadership; second, the creation of critical Cold War institutions; and, third, the space race (pp. 2–5). The distinction between the perception and the reality of Eisenhower’s leadership is an important one for the author. As Mieczkowski explains, “The Sputnik ‘panic’ was not a public panic but a press and political one. The media, the military, politicians, industry, and scientists formed a mass of interests that exaggerated Sputnik’s importance, with the ultimate effect of generating support for space and defense programs” (p. 25). Mieczkowski argues that while Eisenhower’s public image took a beating after the Sputnik launch, he ultimately remained true to his fiscally conservative principles by refusing to react hastily to the launch by throwing money at numerous “crash-projects.” Despite being vilified by the press and the Democratic Party, Eisenhower’s slow and steady leadership prevailed, according to Mieczkowski. In fact, 1957 was a “banner year” for missile development (p. 56). “The truth was that Eisenhower’s administration guided one of the most energetic, fast-moving scientific programs in history . . . when his presidency ended, the United States had gone from having no large rockets or a measurable space program to having IRBMs, ICBMs, and space satellites” (p. 285).

Mieczkoski follows Walter A. McDougall (The Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age, 1985) in emphasizing the importance Eisenhower attached to surveillance from space over the exploitation of the conquest of space for purposes of national prestige (p. 35). While Kennedy and the Democratic Party in general proved much more successful at capturing public enthusiasm for space and in capitalizing on the prestige value of space exploits in the context of the Cold War competition, Eisenhower failed...