Forms and Concepts: Concept Formation in the Platonic Tradition by Christoph Helmig (review)

Ancient theories on concept formation are wildly different, and even within the Platonic tradition we find considerable divergences. Helmig’s book covers almost the whole range of this tradition in antiquity, Proclus being the last author to be discussed substantially. The Platonist account of knowledge acquisition is centered on the notion of recollection (ἀνάμνησις), where Helmig suggests that the content of recollection is a set of universal concepts. In Plato, there can be no sudden leap from ignorance to knowledge, but only a long process involving reason. Traces of such a notion can be found everywhere in the dialogues. Helmig also argues—to my mind rightly—that the approach stating that recollection is confined to higher learning is misguided.

Among other Platonists in the early imperial period, he discusses Alcinous at length, arguing that his epistemology is purely Platonic without any significant Aristotelian input. This implies that the so-called δοξαστικὸς λόγος cannot be taken as a concept or proposition acquired in a purely empirical way. The Neoplatonists developed an elaborate epistemology based on innate knowledge. Plotinus anticipated much of what we find in Syrianus and Proclus, especially on the connection between sense perception and reason, as well as on the distinction between different types of concepts. An important innovation of Proclus seems to be that we cannot assume that comparing sense data and innate knowledge is a conscious act; we can make use of our innate knowledge, although we may not able to account for it. It leads immediately to problems about our grasp of the content of the soul. Proclus, as well as Damascius, suggested that we possess confused notions of our innate knowledge that need to be articulated further. This articulation, however, is subject to error. Such a strong emphasis on the Platonic epistemology raises the more general question about the tendencies in that period to find harmony between Plato and Aristotle. We must admit that the efforts of reconciliation had very clear limits.

Two short remarks may be in place. In discussing the theory of recollection, Helmig lays particular stress on the sources of error involved in the process (317). He also registers the problem of continuity between Meno and Phaedo. We might suggest that one important difference between the two accounts can be explained with reference to the problem of error. The content of recollection in the Meno is propositional and therefore exposed to falsity. By contrast, recollection in the Phaedo concerns concepts (noted on 59) that are neither true nor false. It may be that Plato changed his view in order to avoid the difficulties of justification of innate propositions. This, of course, implies that recollection in the Phaedo is nothing but a prerequisite for knowledge, which may be a kind of causal explanation referring to the Forms. Moreover, one can agree that Proclus’ notion of προβολή is not easy to interpret and translations (into “projection,” “putting forward,“ or “advancing”) mirror the difficulty. Among other possibilities, projection onto phantasia in geometrical thinking might not be interpreted as a process whereby the soul alienates itself from itself (298). It might be an overstatement. After all, in Proclus’ account, phantasia, along with a considerable range of sense perception, is fused with the rational element throughout. Callicles does not figure in the Theaetetus (322).

The book is furnished with extensive bibliography and indices. It is a highly rewarding reading for all students in ancient philosophy, especially for those interested in any aspects of epistemology and theory of the soul.