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I , I . l - ~I ~' .- I I ~ -.-">: . '"i · ~ . • . - -..- . I ( • i -·· . ~ I L • ,, ' . - -~ .· ..· d , I ' I f·\ i I ! .. I ,. I !. .. r . \ · I·· ,., l I . (" 1 · . r. 1 ' o .. ' . . -; ..... .:_, - ; -· '.- . / ATHENS DURING THE CIVIL . WAR: '1944 H. A. THOMPSON Those who emerged as party leaders in the several cities, by assuming on either side a fair-sounding name, the one using as its catch-word '_ 'political equality for the masses under the law," the other "temperate aristocracy," whjle they pretended to be devoted to the common weal, in · reality made it their prize__Thucydides III.82.8 (Loeb translation). Q UR aircraft droi1ed low over the Ionian Islands tn its passage from - .south Italy ...to ~thens on Novembe1: 29, 1944. To· the north, Corfu clun,g to the.mainland; to the sout~, as we approached, Ithaca detached herselffrom the embrace of (ephalonia; in a few minutes we were over the \ G~ulf of Patras and were looking 4own on Messolonghi.: a dull blur in a dreary waste 9f lagoons. . · I· had been re-reading Lord Byron's last letters written from Cephalonia and Messolonghi in the autumn of 1823 and the spring ofl8.24,. at a tim~, _that i~, when the Greeks·appeared to be well on their way toward achieving final deliverance from the Turk. Byron's trenchant judgments on those whom he had come to help kept runnin'g_through my mind.: The Greeks appear in more danger from .their own divisions than from the attacks ofthe 4 enemy. There·is a talk of tre·achery, and all sorts of parties amongst them; a jealousyof strangers, and a desire for nothing but money. .. . . They have at l'ength found leisure to quarrel among themselves, after repe~ling their ~ther encl11ies·, ~nd it is no very easy part that I may have to play to avoid appearing partial t'o one or other of their factions. ·... The Greeks ... who .seem to have no enemies in heaven.or in earth to be dread'ed but 'their own tendency to discord amongst them~elves.. . . We have heard soinc rumours of new dissensions, nay, of the existence of a civil war. ' Byron's apprehension of 120 years ago accorded all too wel_l with present fears; but these p_remonitions were lulled by the beauty of the landscape that was revealed by our further passage along the Gulf of Corinth: the snow:..capped S':lmmits of Erymanthos, Parnassos, and Helicon, their Jo~er ­ slopes -.fresh with the green of winter wheat and flecked with the autumn gold of plane-trees. ·Then the Corinth Canal struck a grim note; even from our height we could see that its bridges were gone, its sides deeply cratered, · its channel blocl~ed by sunken vessels. And eqnall~ sombre. was the scene on th~ airfield at Tatoi where we landed. The ebb and flow of war (1940,· 1941, 1944) had reduced much of the area to pitted countryside and had. ~ left all its buildings twisted tangles of steel frames. · 'These gloomy circumstances, however, had by no mea~s daunted the Greek driver who conveyed us to Athens in an ·abandoned German motor b~s that required repeated nursing even on that ten-~ile run. We were spared the flowers and the ktsses which had greeted the first Allied troops' to r'e-:-enter the liberated city six weeks earlier. The initial ebullience hadsubsided , leaving only a warm glow of gratitude toward, the Allies.- On 170 ., .......-..··-. ' :~ . t. :t, . l . ..\ ' •' r I:: I' ~..: J. .. r I ' ~ . ' .· '- ' l t · . I: ' . I • I I l f I I''· I • r. L·. r '• ' ) ' .•..;;·I - -. .- ,. ...· -.... _ \ • ATHENS: 1944 - 171 \ . ~very side one·heard he-artfelt expres;ion's 9f appreciation for .the·material .ai'd and moral ~ncouragement 'that .had been provided by th~ British and Americans . ~.. i·.· : ' I.:' I 1 -.'1 (~ l \ . ll .··,: t'0.: .:, I"' I' .. . l. .,· l- ,· i . ,. ' r· ·. I. I. '· ' !~ •. ; . 'I t· .. I· '• ·• ~ : I·. ...:, . .. ( · · I' ( {, ' ...... < ; I I , ., '1, , ·. ·. i. ;· t ' . I • 'I' . -,_- ~ .·. : :.( ~ :~.... \. : I . . ' .. 'I ~,._ 1- ~' ; ',, 1'1 ~ \ I I• •r !.. I ~ · r. I I ,, i r'.~.,: ,·.:·· - '• I·' I ( 'I . i'' . t· ··- ,, I l .., I I -~,_ I" I• I l ._ , '.. • ;· I .., I . l . ~ \ \ ... I . .. 177 I I ' .. r ! , ' ' . mutt~ti, fish, cheese, an'd wine, none of .which were tasted by.civilians of the {v6rkihg class for months on .end. The memory !of such discrimin~tion·still rankled. . ~ ' ' \ : '• . . The ELAS~ites looked·fo~ward with particular relish 'to the attack which th~y were plann~ng for Saturday night, December 9, against the Military . .· Academy, then garrisoned by poli.ce. One of fl1Y attendants, a young soldier, . re.marked. that it would be o-nly just to butcher all the prisoners. -There cafl be no doubt that the feelings between EA.M and the police ~ere rp.utual and this willexplain the otherwise incomp-rehensible brutality of ~he·p.oli.ce in firing directly into the EAM parade on that ·fateful Sunday cmorning. , Th~ next most serious complaint had to do with the negotiations for disarmament. It was .generally stated that the ~est solution for the dis~ armament problem would have been for all forces, both ".reglilar, and "irregular," to have laid down the.ir arms at once and then !or a ne:W regular army to have been formed through enlistment. by clas~es. This procedure was not acceptable to the Papandreou government: As an alte_ rnative,·'EAM-ELAS would have been satisfied with a ne'w regul~r army in which the incoming brigades and the irr.egular fo'rces were represented, butonly on coJ:ldition that'.the contingent from ELAS was equal in number to all the other milita~y forces and -police forces •Combined. . Their present preponderan ~ position in the country entitled them, they ·insisted, to at least 'this. representatim~: The Papandreou government, how~ver, even in its greatest concessions, would not .accept this formula. ELAS-ites were adamant in maintaining that they ~ouJd not now lay dow~ arms until some at least of their demands had ·been met in fact and not merely by· promises.. They reminded me that in the hiatus of several days which (int'ervened between the German evacuation of the Athens-Piraeus area and the arri~al of substantial British forces, EAM-ELAS; although pres~nt in . strength, had made no effort to s~ize. ~ontrol. This was adduced as proof of goqd faith. The lack of organization evident in all EAM,s activities in the area visited tended to confirm their contention that the movement in.· December was hastily conceived. British interference was deeply resented by all with who~ I talked, eveh ··by the most sober. They continually pointed out that Greece had been Britain's first and most faithful ally in this part of the world; why should 1 she now be treated like a-satellite? Again and again they would refer. to the Atlantic Charter and ask, "Does it' or does it not mean anything?, I( moreover, Bri.tain felt obliged to intervene, why did sh_ e champion the on~ side, and that the side which had begun the violence by.firing on the un:... \ ' armed procession on Sunday, December 3? Back of the present British intervention, EAM insisted ori seeing a determination to restore the King. My repeated reminder that the British government had agreed to leave ' this matter to the free choice of the Greek people never elicited rriore than polite scepticism. General Scobie arid the British Arn:bassador we~e singled out as the ,arch· criminals and they were unsparingly condemned. l\!Ir. • I • r•, I.,. . .~ .... : ' ... •.• l • • ..t ~ ' ' l ' I · •, J." ' l 'I -L. ~~· -' "·. • . r I. •:] ~·~·~t :1 I ' ' I - '. ' ~ \ • 1 1· - '1 I : J,. ..-; l ' I. I ~ : 1, •• ~ - . . . , I i r- \ I·' ~ - ~i- • •, r r. !·' :'lI , .':· ;_ _ ( ' . i: . , ' ' . ' r' I l I,, , I,,'. i: ., ! . 'I ' . . ~ ... - • ,. r , .. J ·.. • : •' • ..~1 I . ~ ' -.,~ THE UNIVERSITY OF TORO~TO QUARTERLY , . ...... ;· ' . .\ Churchill,_they argued, must have been ill-informed or'ill-advised or b~th; _ in-any case he had made grievoqs errors. · His name; however, was always mentioned with respect and his great qualities were often freeiy admired. All those who 'condemned British interfer~nce, even those ~ho •were most bitter, nevertheless la~ented the break between 'Greece an.d England._ This struck them as sometlling unnatural and inherently wrong. In their . next breath, however, they would insist that they had fought for their freedom against Italians and Germans and would defend i_t even against~ the British. · . . · · Occasionally the complaint was made that _ Allied relief had been slow 1 in starting and even after six weeks was inadequate in scale. They were disturbed , however, by the threat ~lleged to have .been made by. General Scobie that in view of the present troubles the Allied relief program_might· · be·entirely cancelled. When questioned as to their idea of a future government, E.dM officials and ELdS officers insisted t~a·t they had n~ desire for a one-party government . What· they wanted was an, adequate representation in a national government free from foreign domination. Nor would they insist o'n having the Prime Minister chosen frotil among their ranks. · As to suitable. .candichites for the premiership they were vague. They _ appeared to hold no great resentment against 1\1. Papandreou, believing that in the final weeks '. before the crisis he had been little more than a tool of the British. ·Wdleri asked which of their own peopl~ might be considered ·-for the pre~iership, . they spoke with most respect of M. Svolos, but even of him they did not . '' speak with enthusiasm. They insisted that they had achieved _something· new in Greek public life, namely, a polit_ ical,party that enjoyed the support of a real majority of the Greek people; hence there was ·no longer need of dominant personalities. There was very ljttle talk of communism. The young intellectuals who . talked most freely of EdM's grievances and aims did not mention it. Several of the middle-aged civilian members of the party took ·pains to insist that they themselves had no·use for communism and that only a small proportion of E.dM was interested. There appeared to be more hope in _their minds fqr a settlement.from without than from within. The attitude of the House of Commons was heing followed closely," and satisfaction was expressed over the abstention .· of s~ many Labour members in the recent vote of confidence. It was felt that th"e majority of the English press had been well disposed toward the cause o( EAM from the beginning and a recent swing in the line taken by-· ,The Times was regarded as a good omen. ,-The interventi~ri of the United States and Ru_ ssia was eagerly desired: , .No indication was given as to what form this interventi.on might be. expected to take; rather there was a mystic faith and hope that these two · couptries would not see JJ,dM's cause collapse. Nor did anyone comment. on -the inconsistencyJn beseech~ng from the·United States and Russia the o \ ., ~.· - _,'' ·, _·, .- \·. - . ·- , . . . r (· AT;HE.NS: 1944 179 ... h• . I. I ' ' :t: l. -· 'I . I . -... i •;. I I· l . : ·. I:, ~ i: '•' ' ' , ! '-~· ' I• I !.:·. .• ... '., \ I · I. ..~ .intervention which was so violently r~sented not only in fact but in principle when proffered by Rritain. . . Again and·again I was assured that EAM-EL4S were determined to keep up ~he struggle until ~n acceptable solution.had _ been obtained. In ~935-6 the people were duped, they said, and the ·price of yielding too·readilr·~as dictatorship. Now,-ev:en if beaten in Athens, they would with-, draw to the villages and the moun.tains, their more familiar battleground,. and would.fight until they had made sure oftheir freedom·. . I need on'ly outline subsequent events in:Athens. Fighting dragged o~ thro~gh Decem.ber. On Christmas Day Prime Minister Churchill and Mr. . Anthony Eden made their dramatic appearance in Athens. Th~ most significant result of their visit was the appointment of Archbishop -Da-: maskinos·as regent, a move which at least allayed suspicions about British 1 policy regarding the return of the King. Another move in the same direction w.as the choice of General P1astiras as· Prime Minister. At this juncture .he was remembered chiefly for his Uf!.Compromising attit\}de .toward the monarchy in the twenties and thirties. 'Partly in c~nsequence of the 'improv~d atmosphere and partly as a result of the growing British mastery of the miiitary ~situation, . fighting came to a stop on January 15. Subsequent negotiations resulted, on February 13, in the Varkiza Agreement. The Agreement specined that ELAS should lay down· its arms within two weeks; that EAM and the communist party should be - recognized legally but should not have representation in the Plastiras go'v:ernment; that the prosecution of outs~anding collaborationists should be beg'un at once; and that elections and a plebiscite on the constitution should be held within the ye. ar. · _ No final assessment of either the motives or the conduct .of the British · authorities in connection with the troubles can be m~de before the publi- .cation of much more of the ev:idence relating not _ only to the events thell?-selves but also to the long period of incubation 'that preceded them. The followi !lg observations are therefore to be regarded as merely personal and tentative. ,Let me emphasize in the first place that, as far as I was in a position to judge, British intentions toward Greece were honourable. I have discussed Greek problems with Briti_ sh liaison officers who had spent months or years inside the country during the occupation. While· in Athens I h~d some. contact with the British troops, both officers and men, who were doing the :fighting. .I had long conversations with the British general who led the .:fighting, both before he,. entered the country and as he came ·out.. I have also hear-d the opinions of the staffs of the ~ritish embassy in Athens and of the Resident British Minister in the Near East. There was, to be sure, a 'co.t:tsiderable v~riety of opinion among and even within these various: .·gro'ups, as appea~ed clearl'y from the debates in the House of Commons .at the time. I can: say, however, that every responsible Englishman with whom I talked was as much concerned for Greek as for British interests, i ' / . .- I : I ' i ... I a 0 , 1 : f j' •, ' ~ .../ I·- : ... . • 1.· ,--. "I· l il ···· I_ I ~ .' .·-.. I· ~. I I I· ~~ I·. I ~~ . I " I ,.. ...- ' . I- 'l r , ' .' •,. :. ;I I' I - •I .. I ' • : . ' • ... ) ~ ' , • ' I "- l ~ - ' ~- II ~.r. ll ., ~,1 ~~ • I ... ~ J,...•.,: \ 180 I . .._ _.. I · . ' J ,) THE UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO QlJARTERLY • I . ~ • I ... ' -. .. ,· ' . I I I I • ·A ,I. and ~ost of'them· were more anxio.us about 'the welfare of Greece ~h~n about the ,.~ritis~-positi~n 'in that part of the world. · And ~he;eas many ,Greeks· 1,, and many outside ··critics appeared to believe that the British ·took ··a fiendish delight in interferi'ng in the affairs of another c'ountry, iny impression on the spot was th~t the .British thems~Jves loathed the who1~ bu'si.ness. That Greek and British inten~sis were Jargely co-te~mino.us should, ofcourse, be self-evident. Viewing the matter even from the most ' .· 1 utilit~riim· angle, t~e British realized that -much more important. than military bases or formal pacts was the goodwill of the Greek people, and t:his , could best be .assured by restoring political harmony ·and ec~nomic pros- . perity as speedily as possible. I feel, further, th,at the British were justified i!l backing the Papandreou · · ,g~vernment after its return to liberated Greece. This government hadbeen formed after treme~dous effort and it proyided· as broad a1~d as fair a . .representation of parties· as was humanly possible at the time. That it should ·have continued to be subject to interminable changes 'in response to the Clamours of one party or another was patently prepostero-qs; .no . government could fun-ction on such terms ~ Supporting the Papandreou government, 'therefore, seemed the best way of maint~ining the country on.· an ~ven keel in the critical period between liberation and the first election: I . . Granted, however, that the British policy was right in p~inciple, it may'· be objected that it frequently suffered.through lack oftact in its application·or through misunderstanding of the Greek te~perament. One small but typical example will illustrate the point. In the orders of .the day issued . I ' , by General Scobie in Athens in the opening days. of the trouble ·last December , object~on was taken to the street cries-and it was insisted that they·cease·. Now anyone who has known Greece at times of political tension is well aware that sho~ting i·s ·a salutary safety-valve and should no'.more be suppressed than orating at Hyde Park Corner. By insisting on this·p·oint, the British Command annoyed the _Greeks and at the same time made itself ridiculous in their eyes. · I In this connection it should be emphasized that the fighti_ng last winter was localized and confined almost entirely to Athens and the Piraeus; thi~ was true in spite.o( the fac~ 'that much the same elements of potential trouble existed in provincial towns such as Patras and Salonika, albeit on a smaller:scale. That open conflict was averted in those places was owing · largely to the more tactful handling of the situation by the local authorities on both sides, I \ , Many critics at.the time, and even today, assign the whole or the.major part of the blame to the British. Such a judgment, I would submit, displays a dangerous ignorance of. the Greek temperament and of Gree~ .history. All through the. ages, the Greeks when under strain. have given way to what· they themselves ·call "stasis," that is, factional riva1ry which, is ~ggravated by intransigence in their political relations and inevitably ends m· civil strife. The situation in -1944-5 was fundamentally similar to that . I • . . • . • ' .' .. '' I ' ;. i·: ~:·.·\' :·. ·, [; .·· ' '1.. •• j ' . li .·~ ill '· ., I ,. 1 \ I l l I ') I I ·· I l I rI i'·:I ' i .., '• i ' \ ~. ' - ': i '' I ' I l ' ...... I t ' • t I . I .·, \ • l ' ·.1 A·THENS: .1944 181 in the cl~sing years of the Gr.eek War of I.~~ependence during the tw~nties·of th~ last century. The letters written.home by Lord.Byron from western Greece in "1823 and 1824 are identical"in tone and i~ the scene they .describe with the letters of our British liaison officers ·of the past few years. Byron, . lik~ them, was conscious both of the splendid principles at stake and of the 'sordid and roundabout ways.in which they were often achieved. Or, to go back to a time when no Englishm~n had yet appeared on the.scene,_Thu- · cydides' judgment in the third book of 'his history regarding.civil strife within the Greek city states is directly. .' applicable to the events of ·1944. -S." · There exists no more penetrating or credible analysis than Thucydides; of · this, the least attractive·; side of the Greek genius.. ., "\ ''• .\ ' ' I ,•. . f ...

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