Abstract

What happens when an environmental NGO (ENGO) becomes involved in fisheries management, and its involvement is recognized by the managing authorities? The answer depends on the preferences and the measures of the ENGO. We use a bioeconomic objective function where fishers and regulator have ecological, economic, and social preferences, whereas the ENGO has only ecological preferences. Applying a Cournot model we analyze how the original regulation of the authorities is affected when an ENGO becomes involved. We use empirical data on fisheries stakeholder preferences and from the Portuguese and Spanish sardine purse seine fishery to calibrate and test the model. (JEL Q22, Q28)

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Additional Information

ISSN
1543-8325
Print ISSN
0023-7639
Pages
pp. 560-573
Launched on MUSE
2014-07-10
Open Access
No
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