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  • Japanese Scholarship on the Sino-Japanese War:Principle Trends and Achievements, 2007–2012
  • Duan Ruicong (bio)
    Translated by Joseph Passman (bio)

Introduction

The year 2012 marked the fortieth anniversary of diplomatic relations between Japan and the People’s Republic of China. However, as a result of the Japanese government’s September 11, 2012, announcement of its intention to “nationalize” the Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands, protests broke out across many Chinese cities, leading to a serious deterioration of Sino-Japanese relations. A September 2012 public opinion poll conducted by Japan’s Cabinet Office indicated that 80.6 percent of Japanese citizens surveyed did not have favorable feelings toward China and 92.8 percent considered the state of Sino-Japanese relations to be poor.1 Relations between the two countries had worsened not only because of concrete factors (like the Diaoyu Islands dispute) but also as a result of historical influences.

When speaking of historical influences in this context, one cannot avoid the topic of the Sino-Japanese War. Therefore, for the benefit of the reader, I will examine in detail the last five years of Japanese scholarship related to the Sino-Japanese War, highlighting its principle trends and achievements. Within the broad range and large volume of scholarship on the subject, I will focus foremost on the 2007–2012 period, although by necessity this article will also touch on pre-2007 scholarship. Additionally, this overview will introduce primarily Japanese-language, single-authored and coauthored books (monographs), collections of papers, and other single-issue [End Page 287] publications; only when necessary will it refer to pertinent journal articles.

In Japan, there are two main groups of scholars who deal with Sino-Japanese War research. One group consists of scholars of contemporary Japanese history; the other group includes scholars who research contemporary Chinese history. In the past, exchange between these two groups of scholars was quite limited. But in recent years, some Japanese historians have begun to work with Chinese historians to conduct and publish joint research. I believe that this type of scholarly exchange not only advances the development of Sino-Japanese War scholarship and deepens the public’s understanding of the objective facts related to the war itself, but also may help improve Sino-Japanese relations.

Two different terms are used in Japan to refer to the Sino-Japanese War, namely, the “Eight-Year War” and the “Fifteen-Year War.” One group of scholars maintains that the war began on July 7, 1937, with the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, while the other group of scholars contends that it began with the Mukden Incident, on September 18, 1931. Both groups agree that the Sino-Japanese War ended on August 15, 1945, with the conclusion of World War II. Those scholars who hold to the term “Eight-Year War” claim that the events that led up to the outbreak of full hostilities on July 7, 1937, including the Mukden Incident, the Shanghai Incident of 1932, and the North China Incident of 1935, are not inevitably or causally linked. In particular, they assert that the military clashes between Japan and China during the period between the Tanggu Truce of 1933 and the Marco Polo Bridge Incident should not be characterized as full-scale war. By contrast, the scholar Keiichi Eguchi supports his claim of a “Fifteen-Year War” by dividing the fifteen-year period into three stages: the Mukden Incident, the Sino-Japanese War, and the Pacific War (Keiichi 1986, 3–4; 2001, 9). However, it is notable that Keiichi believes that the Mukden Incident did not inevitably lead to the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War. In other words, according to him, the Mukden Incident and the larger Sino-Japanese War did not occur successively as the result of policies set forth by the Japanese government. In this regard, the viewpoint of scholars from China is categorically different. Based on Kazutaka Kikuchi’s analysis of Chinese domestic factors—including relations between the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Chinese Communist [End Page 288] Party (CCP), the anti-Japanese National Salvation Movement, and so on—the period between the Mukden Incident and the Marco Polo Bridge Incident should be viewed as a period of preparation for war...

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