Pathogens for War: Biological Weapons, Canadian Life Scientists, and North America Biodefence by Donald Avery (review)

Professor Donald Avery has written the most definitive available history of the Canadian biological warfare (BW) program. The scope of Pathogens for War is to analyze “the impact of bioweapons, bioterrorism, and pandemics within the historical context” (p. 3). Avery places the Canadian BW narrative with several broader contexts: (1) national politics where the Canadian government pursued a secret BW research and development program in the face of mounting public antipathy; (2) North Atlantic security, which bound Canada into combined biological planning with the United States and the United Kingdom; and (3) the role of BW within a world dominated by nuclear weapons.

Although the United States was the dominant partner in the above Tripartite alliance, Avery details the important contributions Canada made to their combined BW program: a major testing ground, the Suffield Experimental Station, the joint U.S. Canadian rinderpest station on Grosse Isle, the Kingston Laboratory that researched shellfish poisons and insect vectors. Of special importance to the joint BW effort were the outstanding Canadian scientists who gained the respect of their American colleagues.

Pathogens for War is divided into two sections: part 1 deals with biological weapons programs during the Second World War and the Cold War, part 2 with the changes in BW policy and preparedness following President Nixon’s 1969 renunciation of the offensive program. Part 1 is dominated by the BW threat from state powers, Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, and Soviet Russia; part 2 by the bioterrorism threat accompanied by increasing concern over pandemics and anxiety over BW proliferation. In part 1 the major threat comes from traditional biological agents, in part 2 from genetically engineered agents. During both phases, the threat of BW sabotage remained a matter of high concern. Biological weapons, with their ability to penetrate into buildings, were seen as highly effective when used against urban centers. One attack model predicted that if Toronto were deluged with anthrax, the attack would result in casualties of “‘at least 20% of the exposed population’” (p. 163).

The difficulties of preparing against a biological attack were complicated by several factors. First, since initial BW research and development takes place in laboratories and can be masked as genuine medical research, it is excruciatingly difficult to obtain intelligence on BW activities. Second, a deliberate BW attack could be difficult to distinguish from a natural disease outbreak. Third, in case of a biological attack, it was highly unlikely that the defender could detect the incoming attack or identify the agent in real time.

The limitations of BW intelligence created a planning dilemma. Since security officials were uncertain of the BW capabilities of their potential enemies, they planned for the worst. The BW attack scenarios depicted catastrophic events. Given the scarcity of historical record, the BW scenarios largely reflected the horrendous effects produced by the plagues of the past. As the recent SARS and bird flu epidemics have reminded us, nature has proven to be a greater killer than man.

As Avery points out, biological weapons research has created its own dilemmas. Professional scientists prefer open research, which many arms controllers also favor as building confidence that a potential enemy is not cheating on the Biological Warfare Convention (1972), which prohibits the production, stockpiling, maintenance, or transfer of biological agents and toxins. But open ended research, especially given the work on recombinant DNA, poses the threat of proliferating the capabilities of rogue nations.

How well prepared were the major national states to wage BW during the Cold War? Avery judges that by 1969, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada had transformed BW into a viable military option. They could create agents, establish production facilities, and produce the weapons necessary for the delivery of biological attacks. Moreover, the large area coverage dissemination concept was demonstrated by the trials held under Project 112. A caveat is necessary: Avery claims that two...