Chinese Aerospace Power: Evolving Maritime Roles ed. by Andrew S. Erickson and Lyle J. Goldstein (review)

Chinese Aerospace Power: Evolving Maritime Roles is a compilation of the articles presented in the U.S. Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) fourth annual conference (December 10–11, 2008). The conference focused on an analysis of the objectives and strategies that the leaders of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) pursue by investing heavily in aerospace technology developments (missiles, satellites, microsatellites, UAV, C4ISR, fourth-generation fighting aircraft, electronic warfare technologies, etc.), their application to improve the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) effectiveness, and their implications for U.S. strategy in the Asia-Pacific region, particularly for the U.S. Navy. That the U.S. preponderance in the Pacific Ocean is now contested by Chinese asymmetric military developments is topmost among these implications. Consequently, our authors call U.S. military thinkers’ attention to the need to correctly assess the magnitude and implications of the Chinese modernization effort, in order to let the U.S. Navy prepare to overcome the new Chinese military capabilities successfully in the unfortunate circumstance of an armed contingency, once the options of cooperation, engagement, or deterrence have failed. The articles of this book were prepared by consulting Chinese-language primary sources. The book’s content is divided into six parts; the first is more general and exposes the main themes that the subsequent five parts will discuss in detail.

In the first part of this book, the analysts discuss the Chinese development on aerospace assets with maritime applications. Andrew S. Erickson considers that the rapid, although uneven, development in Chinese aerospace capabilities can be regarded as a revolution, because these developments, taken together, “significantly boost China’s technological level, military capabilities and international position” (p. 5). The most highlighted developments in this section are those “that may offset shortcomings in the face of a more technological advanced adversary” in order to gain and maintain air superiority. Air superiority is important because it significantly reduces the risk of surface operations and provides the political and “military leadership with the operational freedom needed to coerce an opponent to make concessions in political disputes or gain a decisive edge on the surface” (p. 22). Regarding these asymmetric assets, Wayne A. Ulman asserts that although the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) still has to increase the number of its technologically proficient officers and must find a way to compensate for its lack of experience in modern combat, it is emerging as a well-equipped and increasingly well-trained force that will become one of the world’s leading air forces by 2020 (p. 38). In this sense, we can take as an example of PLAAF capability improvements the acquisition of fourth-generation fighters equipped with modern jammers, communications systems, and weapons. The PLAAF also has implemented a new doctrine and more appropriate strategies to twenty-first-century warfare. The PLA’s air force also shows a willingness to be self-critical and having a strong motivation to improve.

On the other hand, PLAAF analysts regard the development of advanced capabilities to carry out strategic strike missions at ranges of 3,000 kilometers as key to becoming a truly independent service, rather than one dependent on the Second Artillery Corps (SAC) or a supporting player to the ground forces. Hence, beyond simply expanding military options against Taiwan (short-range ballistic missile infrastructure), the PRC is also developing the means to deny or complicate the ability or willingness of the United States to intervene in response to the Chinese use of force (p. 30). Among those means stand out ground launched ballistic missiles (GLBM).

Ballistic missiles are “the centrepiece of the PRC’s political and military strategy,” because they have a strong coercive effect, as potential adversaries have limited defensive countermeasures (p. 20). The PRC has the largest...