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The Journal of Military History 68.2 (2004) 657-658



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Jayhawk! The VII Corps in the Persian Gulf War. By Stephen A. Bourque. Washington: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2002. GPO S/N 008-029-00378-3. Maps. Photographs. Charts. Notes. Appendixes. Bibliographical note. Index. Pp. xvi, 514. $52.00 from the Superintendent of Documents, PO Box 371954, Pittsburgh, PA 15250.

Without question, the first Gulf War, better known as Operation Desert Storm, was one of the most thorough and decisive military victories in history. For those of us who followed the campaign via CNN, the war seemed like an unhindered race across the desert, accented by displays of the finest of American technology, with Iraqis surrendering en masse. Dr. Stephen Bourque challenges this perception in Jayhawk!: The VII Corps in the Persian Gulf War in which he demonstrates that Desert Storm was not the seemingly easy victory it appeared to be for the soldiers of the VII Corps. To the contrary, Bourque shows that serious obstacles confronted the VII Corps which could have altered the outcome of the war. Consequently, the credit for victory belongs to the skill of the soldiers, rather than to American technology or Iraqi incompetence. Jayhawk! is an outstanding, in-depth examination of the deployment of the VII Corps in Southwest Asia and a compelling argument to reevaluate the perception of an easy victory.

Bourque illustrates the nature of VII Corps' campaign by examining the action from corps to battalion level based on interviews, communiqués, and after-action reports. In doing so, the difficulty of the campaign becomes apparent. Weather was often poor, with heavy rains and sandstorms degrading the capabilities of equipment, such as optical sights and aircraft. In addition, the tempo of the operation was accelerated and plans were frequently modified. Most importantly, Bourque shows that many Iraqi units, particularly the Republican Guard, defended their positions and counterattacked on several occasions. In many cases, Iraqis surrendered only after their position became hopeless, but not before engaging VII Corps units. In these confrontations, major portions of the Iraqi army and Republican Guard were destroyed with little American loss, demonstrating the skill of the VII Corps soldiers.

Equally important, Bourque effectively explains how the VII Corps utilized the U.S. Army's AirLand Battle doctrine, which until Desert Storm was unproven in battle. Bourque argues that the war validated the doctrine, but also revealed several problems, not the least of which was coordination between Army and Air Force units. Likewise, he is forthright in dealing with [End Page 657] other controversies regarding the VII Corps. Accordingly, he addresses the matters of how elements of the Republican Guard escaped the VII Corps and what factors slowed the advance of the left hook into Kuwait. Moreover, Bourque examines the friction that developed between General H. Norman Schwarzkopf and Lt. General Frederick M. Franks over the VII Corps' rate of advance. Bourque takes a more sympathetic approach to the VII Corps commander, arguing that Schwarzkopf was out of touch with the battle that Franks was fighting.

Jayhawk! is an important contribution to the study of the first Gulf War and towards understanding how the Coalition forces prevailed. It is an excellent work and should become a staple of Gulf War historiography. Bourque convincingly shows that Desert Storm looked easy on CNN because soldiers like those in the VII Corps, made it look easy. This work is recommended for student and scholar alike.



Kevin D. Smith
Tennessee State Museum
Nashville, Tennessee



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